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A critical component of a physician's duties is prescribing medication to his or her
patients. This process is handled by the physician writing a prescription for a medication
and having the medication dispensed to the named patient. A review of federal law
reveals no requirement that the prescription be issued on any type of specific written
instrument such as safety paper, multi-part forms, or other standardized documents.
Because of the lack of adequate controls, there is a serious problem with false and altered
prescriptions being issued within the United States. A 1994 study by the White House
Office of National Drug Control estimated that there was two billion dollars spent
annually on illegal prescription drugs that would have otherwise been spent to support
legitimate activities in the overall domestic economy. Hospital records show that from
1990 through 1995, there has been a steady and alarming increase in overdoses of
prescription medication. The United States Drug Enforcement Administration has
estimated that in 1993 approximately 25 billion dollars in prescription drugs were sold
illegally, compared to a government estimate of 31 billion dollars spent that year on
cocaine. A large percentage of these drugs originate from altered prescriptions.
The mechanics of prescription fraud can take many forms. These include forgery of the
physician's signature, alteration of the dosage or quantity of medication found on a
legitimate prescription, phone-in prescription fraud, and theft of prescription blanks.
Recent developments in the computer field have resulted in computer assisted
cryptographic methods that can authenticate users, signatures, and the contents of
electronic messages. One such method is a public key cryptographic system (PKCS).
This technology allows data to be encrypted over public networks and allows the
recipient of the message to definitively authenticate and verify both the contents and the
sender of the message.
The goal of this investigation was to develop a theoretical schema that uses a public key
cryptographic system to authenticate every prescription written by a licensed physician
and prevent any alteration to its contents. The schema also addresses implementation,
connectivity, security, privacy, and the economic issues that are associated with this type
of system.

Donald R. Lemma
The theoretical schema consists of a model that addresses specific hardware, operating
software, general configuration, implementation, and technical requirements for both the
users of the system and the peripheral equipment that is required by the physician and
pharmacist in order to operate in an effective manner. It also addresses connectivity
issues associated with the dynamic Internet or asynchronous communications link
between the physician's desktop computer and the pharmacist's office computer.
Security and privacy issues specifically address the encryption and decryption
mechanisms that are in place in order to make sure that the prescription information is
secure and authentic. It also consists of requirements for public-key encryption and
software authentication, explores existing products that make use of this technology,
incorporates the products into the theoretical schema, and addresses the configuration
issues required in order to setup the software with an appropriate and functional level
security. Finally, the theoretical schema addresses the issues of password and public-key
maintenance. Economic issues focus on the costs required to implement and maintain the
system and potential revenue streams that exist within the market-place if the captured
prescription drug data is sold to interested third-parties such as pharmaceutical or
healthcare marketing companies.
The technical components of the schema were validated by creating a prototype system
that provided the necessary encryption for a physician and pharmacist. The system
demonstrated that public-key cryptography could be used to encrypt, transmit, decrypt,
and authenticate prescriptions sent between pharmacists and physicians. The system also
demonstrated that the prescriptions can be generated quickly and that the actual
encryption and decryption process could be performed is less than one second.
The economic issues were validated by computing the actual cost of implementing the
system using existing products and comparing these costs against the estimated costs
available from the federal government associated with prescription drug fraud. Finally,
the potential acceptance of the system was evaluated by distributing and correlating the
results of a survey that was distributed to both physicians and pharmacists.
The results showed that a public-key cryptographic system will eliminate prescription
fraud by providing positive authentication of every prescription received by the
pharmacist, and that the contents of the prescription could not be altered between the time
it was written by the physician and received by the pharmacist. The investigation showed
that the system was not expensive to develop or use. It also showed that the majority of
the users (physicians and pharmacists) will be reluctant to embrace the technology;
however, younger and more computer-literate users, as well as those users who perceive
that a significant problem with prescription drug fraud already exists, were more likely to
accept and use the technology.
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Chapter I
Introduction
Problem Statement and Goal
A critical component of a physician's duties is prescribing medication to his or
her patients. This process is handled by the physician writing a prescription (or scrip) for
a medication and having the medication dispensed to the named patient. The basic
prescription includes the name of the drug, the active ingredient strength (dosage), and
the quantity of the medication to be dispensed. The act of dispensing the medication is
then performed by a licensed pharmacist in accordance with the instructions contained on
the scrip. A review of federal law reveals no requirement that the scrip be issued on any
type of specific written medium such as safety paper, multi-part forms, or other
standardized documents. These regulations are reserved for enactment by the various
state government medical and drug regulating governmental bodies. In many states the
prescription can simply be telephoned to the pharmacist by the physician's assistant,
secretary, office manager, or other unlicensed individual. In others, it is simply written
on a photocopied piece of paper containing the physician's name, address, and other
identifying information. Ten states require that the prescription be issued on special
safety paper in triplicate (Weikel, 1996).
Because of the lack of adequate controls, there is a serious problem with false and
altered prescriptions being issued within the United States. The United States Drug
Enforcement Administration has estimated that approximately twenty-five billion dollars
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in prescription drugs were sold illegally in 1993, compared to a government estimate of
thirty-one billion dollars spent that year on cocaine. A large percentage of these drugs
originate from altered prescriptions (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1998a).
The mechanics of prescription fraud can take many forms. These include
prescription scrip forgery, phone-in prescription fraud, and unscrupulous practices of
medical professionals (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1998a). The act of prescription
forgery consists of falsifying prescriptions for controlled substances using stolen
prescription blanks, changing valid prescriptions by altering the physician's written
instructions on the prescription blank, or changing the strengths or quantities of the
medication. The act of phone-in fraud consists of simply telephoning a pharmacist and
falsely representing that the caller is a licensed physician.
Recent developments in the computer field have resulted in computer assisted
cryptographic methods that can authenticate users, signatures, and the contents of
electronic messages. One such method is a public key cryptographic system (PKCS).
This technology allows data to be encrypted over public networks and for the recipient of
the message to authenticate and verify both the contents and the sender of the message to
a complete degree of certainty (Bhimani, 1996).
The goal of this investigation was to develop a theoretical schema that uses a
public key cryptographic system capable of authenticating every prescription written by a
licensed physician and preventing any alteration to its written contents. The schema
addresses implementation, connectivity, security, privacy, and the economic issues that
are associated with this type of system.
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Implementation issues addressed rollout, installation, maintenance, acceptance,
and support. This includes a technical model that addressed specific hardware, operating
software, general configuration, implementation, and technical requirements for both the
users of the system and the peripheral equipment that is required by the physician and
pharmacist in order to operate in an effective manner. Connectivity issues addressed the
Internet or asynchronous communications link between the physician's desktop computer
and the pharmacist's office computer. Security and privacy issues specifically addressed
the encryption and decryption mechanisms that need to be in place in order to make sure
that the prescription information is secure and authentic. It also defined the requirements
for public-key encryption and software authentication, explored existing products that
make use of this technology that can be incorporated into the theoretical schema, and
. addressed the configuration issues that were required in order to set up the software with
an appropriate, yet functional, level of security. Finally, it addressed the issues of
password and public-key maintenance. Economic issues focused on the costs required to
implement and maintain the system.
The technical and security components of the schema were validated by creating a
prototype system that provided the necessary encryption for a single physician and
pharmacist. The economic issues were validated by estimating the actual cost of
implementing the system using existing products and comparing these costs against the
costs available from the federal government associated with prescription drug fraud.
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Relevance and Significance
Prescription drug fraud is a significant problem in the United States. In 1993,
approximately twenty-five billion dollars was spent on the illegal sale of prescription
drugs. A 1994 study by the White House Office of National Drug Control estimated that
drug abusers spent an additional two billion dollars on illegal prescription drugs, that
would have otherwise been spent to support legitimate activities in the overall domestic
economy (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1998b).
Hospital records show that from 1990 through 1995, there has been a steady and
alarming increase in overdoses of prescription medication. For example, emergency
room episodes for the treatment of Hydro codone overdoses (a narcotic analgesic
containing codeine) increased 169 percent during this time period from 2,600 incidents to
7,000. Trazodone (an antidepressant used in the treatment of aggressive behavior and
cocaine withdrawal) increased 193 percent during this same time period from 3,000
incidents to 8,800 (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1998b). It should be noted that
these emergency room events can be caused accidentally (or intentionally) by patients
who have been given a legitimate prescription; however, these specific drugs must be
consumed in quantities far in excess of the recommended clinical quantity and strength in
order to cause an overdose event (Physician's Desk Reference, 1988).
Since there is a wide disparity among the states in the regulations controlling the
issuance of prescription medication, there are several methods used to obtain the drugs
illegally. The first method is counterfeiting the prescription blanks of licensed
physicians. This is be done by photocopying a blank prescription slip, creating
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prescription slips using a laser printer, or creating prescription slips using more
sophisticated printing techniques on blank safety paper. Because of the large numbers of
physicians that are actively practicing medicine, pharmacists cannot possibly recognize
their handwriting or even the type of prescription blanks that each physician uses.
The most secure system currently available to safeguard against these tecm:iques
is the "triple prescription system". Using this system,a three-part prescription blank is
issued by the state government and sent directly to the physician. When a prescription is
written, one copy remains with the physician, one copy is given to the patient for delivery
to the pharmacist, and one copy is sent directly to the state. This is considered the most
secure method of issuing a prescription that is available today; however, research has
shown that most physicians in states that mandate this system do not approve of it and
would like to see an alternative (Weikel, 1996). Yet, even this system does not prevent
the theft of the actual forms from the physician's office, mail carrier, or the printer. Even
with the most secure paper and record keeping system available, the physician can
inadvertently leave his prescription pad in a treatment room while an unattended patient
is waiting, or someone from the office staff (such as a janitor, a secretary, etc.) can steal
the pads.
This system acts only as a minor deterrent. Forged prescriptions from stolen
blanks would only be discovered through random audits that would usually occur after
the drugs have already been dispensed. If stolen blanks are discovered, an alert is sent to
the pharmacists advising them that the prescriptions written on these forms are invalid
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and law enforcement authorities should be contacted if the scrip is presented by a
customer.
The third method is changing the quantities and/or strength of medications on a
valid prescription. This is accomplished in two ways. First, if the physician wrote a
prescription for 10 pills of 100 milligrams (mg) of "drug X", the patient can add a "0" to
the end of the quantity or strength and change the prescription to 100 pills or 1OOOmg.
Second, there is usually a space on the prescription form for the physician to specify the
number of refills for the prescription. If the physician leaves the space blank (indicating
"no refills") the patient can simply circle or fill-in the number of refills desired.
The fourth method is having an individual telephone the .pharmacist and represent
himself as a physician. Since there is no information required other than the physician's
name, drug name, dose, number of tablets, and instructions for use, the prescription can
easily be falsified. Busy pharmacists do not have the time to call back the physician's
office and verifY each prescription that has been written. Likewise, busy physician's
offices do not want to be interrupted by pharmacists calling every few minutes to verifY
the information.
With the advent of personal computers, there are now electronic alternatives that
can be used to eliminate these fraudulent practices. The critical component of this type of
application, as noted by (Bhimani, 1996), would be a security system that can address the
following six key areas:
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Confidentiality: Verifying that information is private and therefore seen and
accessed only by intended recipients. This is a critical function for this system since
highly confidential patient medical data will be transmitted over a public network.

..

Authentication: Identifying an individual or computer to ensure that the party
attempting to access a given server or database is a member of the appropriate group,
or listed in an access list. For this system, authentication must exist at two levels.
First, the physician must ensure that the prescription data is being received by the
intended recipient (in this case, the pharmacist). The pharmacist must ensure that the
prescription was sent by a licensed physician and not an unauthorized individual.

•

Nonrepudiation: Ensuring that people cannot deny their electronic actions.
Nonrepudiation for this system would ensure that the physician cannot deny that he
issued a specific prescription drug, to a specific patient, for a specific quantity and
dosage, with specific usage instructions.

•

Integrity: Verifying that information received is the information that was put there by
the originator. For this system, there can be no errors in the content of the
prescription information. A single byte added to a dosage (e.g. adding a "0" to the
end of a dosage instruction) can have fatal consequences. From a prescription drug
fraud perspective, the system must ensure that the patient or other unauthorized party
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cannot alter the contents of a valid prescription in order to change the drug, patient,
dosage, or quantity of the medication.

..

Access Control: Verifying that the resources are under the exclusive control of the
authorized parties and ensuring that t.he person attempting to access has the authority
to do so. For this system, physicians must secure only their private password which
is used as the basis for their digital signature. The system would contain only the
application software and not contain any special security codes.

•

Availability: Ensuring that data and server resources are up and running when
needed. This is a critical component for this system. If the system is unavailable due
to a failure in the physician's computer, pharmacist's computer, or the Internet
connection between these systems, the prescription would not be able to be
transmitted and the patient would not be able to get the necessary medication in a
timely manner.

One system that addresses all of these concerns is a public key cryptography
system (PKCS). PKCS was developed in 1976 by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman
(Diffie, 1976). Using this approach, two passwords, or keys, are generated by a PCKS
computer program. The idea of using two passwords is remarkably different from a
classic cryptography system which uses a single cipher or code (MIT, 1998). In the
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classic system, which is also referred to as secret-key or symmetric cryptography, there is
a threat to security since more than one person knows the code.
As an example, suppose an army is using a symmetric cryptography system in
order to transmit troop movement information to its field commanders. If there were five
hundred field commanders,.there are five hundred people who know the code. The code
would need to be distributed to the commanders and updated on a regular basis. If one of
the field commanders were captured, or if the code were intercepted while being
delivered to any of the field commanders, the entire cryptographic system would then be
compromised. In the proposed prescription drug system; there would be thousands of
physicians and thousands of pharmacies; therefore, the threat (and likelihood) of
compromising the integrity of the codes in a symmetric cryptography system would be so
great that the system would neither be practical nor secure. The only practical alternative
is a PKCS system.
In PKCS, one key is designated as the "public key" of the recipient of the
message. This key would be made known to all people who intend to send the recipient a
secured message. The second key is designated as the "private key" and is known only by
the recipient. A message that would be sent to the recipient would be encrypted by the
sender with the recipient's public key. Once the message is encrypted, it can be
decrypted only by using the recipient's private key. If a single byte of the transmission
that has been encrypted with the public key has been altered, then the private key will not
be able to decrypt it. Thus, the contents of the message are secured while traveling
through a public or private network and the sender can be assured that only the intended
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recipient would be able to view the unencrypted contents of the message. The recipient
of the message, however, has no way of authenticating the identify of the sender of the
message (RSA, 1997).
Using the PKCS process in reverse, the sender ofthe message can be
authenticated. The sender would transmit his name using plaintext. He would also
transmit his name again, encrypting it with his private key. The recipient of the message
would then apply the sender's public key to the encrypted signature. If the decrypted
signature matches the plaintext signature, then the message is authentic since only the
holder of the private key would be able to send the message that properly decodes using
the public key.
The most commonly used PKCS system is known as RSA. It was invented in
1977 by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman (Rivest, 1978). The system
works as follows: Take two large primes,p and q, and find their product n = pq, where n
is called the modulus. Choose a number, e less than n and relatively prime to (P-l)(q-l),
which means that e and (P-l)(q-l) have no common factors except 1. Find another
number d such that (ed-I) is divisible by (P-l)(q-l). The values e and d are called the
public and private exponents, respectively. The public key is the pair (n,e); the private
key is the pair (n,d). The factors p and q maybe kept with the private key or destroyed. It
is difficult to obtain the private key d from the public key (n,e). If one could factor n into

p and q, however, then one could obtain the private key d. Thus the security ofRSA is
dependant upon the fact that the factoring of a product of large primes is difficult (RSA,
1998).
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Factoring is the act of splitting an integer into a set of smaller integers (factors)
which,. when multiplied together, form the original integer. For example, the factors of21
are 3 and 7; the factoring problem is to find 3 and 7 when given 21 (RSA, 1999). During
the PKCS encryption process, the keys e and d are multiplied and mathematically applied
to the plaintext message to create large numeric representations of the data (ciphertext).
The ciphertext message can only be read by decrypting the data, which would involve
factoring the very large numbers that were created during the encryption step. When the
secret-key is applied to the data, through the process of mathematical division, the prime
factorization splits the integer back into its unique prime number components and the
original plaintext message can then be read. The mathematical concept that makes PKCS
work is that the process of multiplying two prime integers together is easy, but factoring
the product of two or more prime numbers is much more difficult (RSA, 1999).
The chances of deciphering a code is directly related to the length of the key. The
larger the key, the more difficult it will be to determine the code due to the large
permutations of possible code sequences. For example, a 1 bit key would have two
possible solutions (0 or 1). A 40 bit key, would have over one trillion possible solutions
(240). "Military Grade" encryption consists of keys that are 128 bits or larger. Even with
the excellent security offered by a PKCS, there are three techniques that can be used to
break the integrity of the PKCS system.
The first technique is having an unauthorized individual obtain the private key
through visual or electronic surveillance of the person who holds the private key (known
as the keyholder). This may include visual or electronic monitoring of the keyboard so
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that the keyholder's keystrokes can be recorded. It may also include intercepting or
monitoring the transmission between the host computer and terminal when the keyholder
is entering the private key into the system.
The second technique is the guessed plaintext attack. An attacker sees a
ciphertext, guesses that the message might be "Attack AtDawn," and encrypts this guess
with the public key of the recipient. By comparing the ciphertext that results from the
encryption of this message to the actual ciphertext of the message that the attacker is
trying to read, the attacker can figure out if the guessed message is correct. Modem
computer systems can perform this function by generating billions of guesses in a matter
of minutes and quickly scanning the results for matches (RSA, 1998). The interesting
part of this approach is that the chance of success is not dependant upon the key length, it
is dependant upon the length of the message itself.
The third technique is that the key can be broken using cryptographic deciphering
programs (Kochanski, 1988). The mathematics behind this technique is to factor the
public modulus n, into its two prime factors,p and q. Fromp, q, and e (the public
exponent) the attacker can easily derive d, the private exponent. The hard part is
factoring n, and the security of the PKCS system depends on this factoring being
difficult. Once n is factored, the key is compromised (RSA, 1998).
It should be noted that the government believes that this type of cryptography is

so secure that the National Security Agency and the Defense Trade Controls Unit of the
United States Department of State has determined that software programs using
cryptographic keys in excess of 40-bits are illegal to export and are actually considered to
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be in the same trade category as weapons and munitions (MIT, 1998). The reason for the
concern about the 40-bit limitation is that the NSA has the capability of deciphering these
messages in a few hours using their supercomputers and they wish to have the capability
of monitoring every electronic transmission that crosses an international border.
Messages encrypted with larger keys could take many years to decipher using
conventional technology (MIT, 1998). As an example, the United States Justice
Department recently testified before the Senate that decrypting a single 56-bit message
took the equivalent of 14,000 Pentium-class computers over four months to decrypt (Litt,
1998).
Using PKCS techniques in conjunction with personal computers, a centralized
database of physicians' public keys, and a network delivery system (such as the Internet
or an asynchronous communication gateway using conventional telephone lines), the
pharmacist can definitively verify that the prescription came from a licensed physician,
the physician can definitively ensure that the prescription was received by the intended
pharmacist, and both parties can be assured that the prescription has not had a single bit
of information changed. Since prescriptions are written and filled within the domestic
borders of the United States, a 128-bit PKCS encryption key can be used without
violating any existing laws in order to ensure that the code system cannot be broken by
sophisticated criminals using supercomputers.
The physician's public and private key combination would have to be created
prior to using the system. The public key would be stored at a specific public site on the
Internet. The physician could change his private-key at any time; however, the key
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creation process would have to be repeated and the new corresponding public key would
have to be added to the public site.
After the keys are created the actual process of issuing prescriptions would be
automated and would consist of six steps:
1. The physician enters (or has his office staff enter) the prescription into a
computer. A standard application interface would be used so that the screen
would be the same on every computer system in the country. This is an
improvement over the existing system since a physician who practices at
different hospitals uses different forms in order to issue a prescription;
however, the information entered in both the manual and automated systems is
the same.

2. The physician would enter his or her private-key encryption password in order
to create a digital signature. This step replaces the physician's written
signature that would appear on a paper prescription blank. Since the contents
of the encoded message cannot be altered by even a single byte without
destroying the entire contents of the message, the possibility of prescription
drug fraud through alteration or forgery would be eliminated.

3. Ifthe prescription is to be sent through the Internet or an asynchonous dial-in
gateway, the patient specifies which pharmacy will be used. The prescription
is encrypted with the pharmacy's public-key password in order to prevent
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unauthorized people from viewing the message contents as it travels through
the communications network. If the prescription is to be sent with the patient
on a floppy diskette to be delivered to any pharmacy, it is encrypted using
only the physician's private-key password.

4. The pharmacy would receive the data and decrypt the prescription. If the
prescription came via floppy diskette, it is decrypted using the physician's
public password which is maintained at the public Internet site. If it came via
the Internet, the prescription contents are decrypted using the pharmacy's
private-key password (the system would have encrypted the prescription using
the pharmacist's public-key which is also maintained at this same site). The
pharmacist would then authenticate the prescription by decrypting the
physician's digital signature using his public key password. Since electronic
messages are easily reproducible, the pharmacist's computer would also
automatically verify that the prescription has not already been filled by
another pharmacy, eliminating the possibility of the patient or other party
duplicating the diskette or message and having it filled at multiple locations.
This would be done by checking a nationwide database that would be
maintained by a sponsoring government agency. The database would
maintain a unique identifier for each prescription (e.g. patient name, drug
dispensed, quantity dispensed, physician name, and date). Since the contents
of the message cannot be changed, the issuance of two prescriptions that came
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from the same electronic message would not be possible since the keys would
be identical. The only limitation with this approach would be that a patient
would not be able to receive two identical prescriptions, from the same doctor,
for the same drug, in the same quantity, on the same day.

5. An electronic acknowledgement would be sent to the nationwide database
indicating that the specific prescription has been filled and the specific drug
(e.g. named drug or generic substitute). The database would be updated in
order to eliminate the possibility of the prescription being filled more than
once or at another pharmacy (since all participating pharmacies would be
connected to the database). The dispensing of the medication contained in the
prescription could not be duplicated by non-participating pharmacies since
they would not have access to the system, nor would they be authorized to
receive electronic prescriptions. It should be noted that the capturing of the
data within the database has a high value. Since pharmaceutical companies
rarely make a direct sale of their product to the end-user, they purchase data
from companies such as IMS, Inc. The IMS data contains approximations of
market-share for the drug manufacturer's products based on surveys of
physicians, drug wholesalers, and other means of statistical sampling. The
data is used to determine marketing strategies, the compensation for the
pharmaceutical salesmen, and pricing. As of 1997, the annual worldwide
market for this data is worth 1.5 billion dollars, with IMS receiving 1.07
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billion in 1997 for providing these services (IMS, 1999). The proposed
system, if fully deployed, should provide the broadest possible spectrum of
domestic data with a higher degree of accuracy and timeliness as compared
with the data provided by IMS.

6. An electronic acknowledgement would be sent to the physician's office
notifying them that the prescription has been filled and indicating the specific
drug and quantity that was dispensed.

Figure 1 illustrates the flow of the prescription and digital signature data through a
PKCS.
Acceptance of this model by state or federal governments could potentially save
thousands of lives and save billions of dollars. It would be inexpensive to develop,
simple to operate, and easy to maintain.
Because this project deals with a theoretical system that uses a mathematical
cryptographic technique, based on a computer application, the review of literature
focused on the topic of public-key cryptography and the hardware and software platforms
that would be required to support a PKCS application. The review included research
relating to the use of the Internet as the transport mechanism to send the encoded packets
of data containing the prescription drug information and digital signatures.
Many of the journal articles that are specific to the cryptographic and computer
system fields address and cross reference each other's area of research (for example, a
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public key cryptographic system article that deals with a mathematical approach to the
coding system will reference the computer system platforms that can be used to integrate
this technology into a useful application). The main contribution of this dissertation is
that it applies PKCS to the domain of prescription drugs and develops a prototype system
that can reduce the potential incidence of prescription drug fraud. The fact that there is
no original research that integrates all three of these areas reaffirms the original nature of
this project. Therefore, the dissertation's thesis meets the requirements of the classic
scholarly model where conclusions will be based upon the foundation of the previous
knowledge and research that has already been performed.
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BARRIERS AND ISSUES
There are several implementation, technical, interconnectivity, security, policy
and economic issues that needed to be resolved in order to develop the prototype system.
First, the technical model will have to be designed in such a fashion that it could be used
throughout the country by individuals with little or no techni~al expertise using disparate
systems. Second, there has to be a methodology incorporated in this model to provide
low cost interconnectivity between thousands of pharmacies and thousands of physicians.
Third, the prescription data traveling through this system is highly confidential and must
be secure from unauthorized browsing, interception, or alteration. Finally, the
deployment of the system will have an overall benefit to the economy, however, there
will be direct costs to the physicians and pharmacists in order to obtain the necessary
equipment and pay for the connectivity and database maintenance charges. These costs
would likely be passed on to the sick and the elderly, which is the segment of the
population that uses prescription medication most frequently and is least able to afford
any additional costs. Therefore, the issue of acquisition and operating costs has to be
addressed, along with an estimate of the direct economic impact that the system will have
on the users.
Since this project represents timely and original research, feedback from
the potential users of the system needed to be obtained in order to determine the likely
acceptance of the system and identify the user's operating requirements. In order to
achieve this objective, a survey was sent to both physicians and pharmacists. The survey
addressed the following primary issues:
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Perception of Prescription Fraud- The survey addressed the physician's and
pharmacist's perception of the extent of prescription fraud that exists on a
regional and local level. The perception was compared to the pharmacist's or
physician's willingness to accept this type of cryptographic system.

It

Current Practices and Procedures- The physician was asked about the
mechanics of issuing prescriptions from their office. The pharmacist was
asked about the mechanics of receiving and accepting prescriptions in their
pharmacy. The mechanism of dispensing and receiving prescriptions was
compared to the pharmacist's or physician's willingness to accept this type of
cryptographic system.

It

Extent of Automation and Computerization- The physicians and pharmacists
were asked about the extent of office automation and computerization at their
offices. They were also asked about the extent of their personal familiarity
with computer systems. The degree of automation that currently exists was
compared to the pharmacist's or physician's willingness to accept this type of
cryptographic system.

It

Acceptance of a Public-Key Cryptographic System- The physicians and
pharmacists were asked about the use of the theoretical PKCS system in their
practice. Issues of cost, security, and reduction in prescription fraud were
addressed. Each of these three factors were compared to the pharmacist's or
physician's willingness to accept this type of cryptographic system.
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..

Desired System Functions- The physicians and pharmacists were asked about
the functions they believe should be integrated into the theoretical PKCS
system. They were also asked to rank the system functions in terms of
importance.

The survey also addressed the demographics of the users and data was analyzed to
find positive relationships related to experience, age, sex, familiarity with computers,
extent of computerization within the existing office environment, economic factors,
geographic region, economic status of patient populations, system functions, and the
physician's or pharmacist's perception as to the extent of prescription fraud. Surveys
were sent to 500 pharmacists and 500 physicians. The response rate was 10%. The
surveys were returned anonymously in a self-addressed envelope that contained no
information regarding the identity of the survey respondent. Prior to being sent, the
surveys were submitted to, and approved by, the Nova Southeastern University
Institutional Review Board (IRB), as required by University regulations.

ELEMENTS TO BE INVESTIGATED
There were four steps involved in conducting the research for this dissertation
using the modem systems development life cycle (MSDLC) (Whitten et aI, 1994). The
first step involved identifying the operating constraints and current legal requirements
that are placed upon the physicians, patients, and pharmacists when issuing and
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dispensing prescriptions. This step included an exhaustive search of medical journals and
pharmaceutical journals, as well as state and federal laws.
The second step involved determining the technical requirements necessary to
build the Public Key Cryptographic System. This step involved review and analysis of
scholarly, technical, ~d promotional materials that exist for the technology and making a
recommendation and analysis based on these documents.
The third step involved developing and describing a methodology for addressing
the security and connectivity problems associated with this type of application. This
process also included the review of scholarly, technical, and promotional materials that
exist for the technology and making a recommendation and analysis based on these
documents.
The fourth step involved identifying the acquisition and implementation costs.
This included research into the cost of the equipment that the theoretical model would
require, the cost of the operation of the system, and the cost of the administration of the
database and any centralized systems required to maintain the operation of the system.
Funding formulas were identified and discussed in terms of practicality and equity.
The comprehensive survey, described in the previous section, was conducted in
tandem with the research and addressed these issues from the physician's and
pharmacist's perspective. The survey was a key element used to determine the likely
acceptance and integration of the theoretical PKCS system in a real-world environment.
A prototype system was developed to demonstrate the functionality of the
theoretical public-key cryptographic system. The prototype system had both a
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pharmacist's and physician's screen interface and addressed the encryption and
transmission issues outlined in this dissertation. It demonstrated that the prescription data
can be encrypted, decrypted, transmitted, and received in a secure and expedient manner.
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SUMMARY
Because of the lack of adequate controls, there is a serious problem with false and
altered prescriptions being issued within the United States. A 1994 study by the White
House Office of National Drug Control estimated that there was two billion dollars spent
annually by prescription drug abusers on illegal prescription drugs that would have
otherwise been spent to support legitimate activities in the overall domestic economy.
Hospital records show that from 1990 through 1995, there has been a steady and alarming
increase in overdoses of prescription medication. The United States Drug Enforcement
Administration has estimated that in 1993 approximately twenty-five billion dollars in
prescription drugs were sold illegally, compared to a government estimate of thirty-one
billion dollars spent that year on cocaine. A large percentage of these drugs originate
from altered prescriptions.
The mechanics of prescription fraud can take many forms. These include forgery
of the physician's signature, alteration of the dosage or quantity of medication found on a
legitimate prescription, phone-in prescription fraud, and theft of prescription blanks.
Recent developments in the computer field have resulted in computer assisted
cryptographic methods that can authenticate users, signatures, and the contents of
electronic messages. One such method is a public key cryptographic system (PKCS).
This technology allows data to be encrypted over public networks and ensures:

•

Confidentiality: Verifying that information is private and therefore seen and
accessed only by intended recipients.
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•

Authentication: Identifying an individual or computer to ensure that the party
attempting to access a given server or database is a member of the appropriate
group, or listed in an access list.

•

Nonrepudiation: Ensuring that people cannot deny their electronic actions.

•

Integrity: Verifying that information received is the information that was put
there by the originator.

•

Access Control: Verifying that the resources are under the exclusive control
of the authorized parties and ensuring that the person attempting to access has
the authority to do so.

•

AvailabiIity: Ensuring that data and server resources are up and running when
needed.

The goal of this investigation was to develop a theoretical schema that used a
public key cryptographic system that can authenticate every prescription written by a
licensed physician and prevent any alteration to its written contents. The schema also
addressed implementation, connectivity, security, privacy, and the economic issues that
were associated with this type of system.
The theoretical schema consisted of a technical model that addressed specific
hardware, operating software, general configuration, implementation, and technical
requirements for both the users of the system and the peripheral equipment that was
required by the physician and pharmacist in order to operate in an effective manner. It
also addressed connectivity issues associated with the dynamic Internet or asynchronous
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communications link between the physician's desktop computer and the pharmacist's
office computer. Security and privacy issues specifically addressed the encryption and
decryption mechanisms that needed to be in place in order to make sure that the
prescription information is secure and authentic. It also consisted of requirements for
public-key encryption and software authentication, explored existing products that make
use of this technology and can be incorporated into the theoretical schema, and addressed
the appropriate configuration issues required in order to set up the software with an
appropriate and functional level security. Finally, it addressed the issues of password and
public-key maintenance. Economic issues focused on the costs required to implement
and maintain the system.
The technical and security components of the scheme were validated by creating a
prototype system that provided the necessary encryption for a single physician and
pharmacist (see the "Methodology" section for additional detail). The economic issues
were validated by estimating the cost of implementing the system using existing products
and comparing these costs against the known costs available from the federal government
associated with prescription drug fraud. Finally, the potential acceptance of the system
was evaluated by distributing and analyzing the results of a survey that was distributed to
both physicians and pharmacists.
It was expected that the proposed public-key cryptographic system would

eliminate prescription fraud by providing positive authentication of every prescription
received by the pharmacist, and that the contents of the prescription would not have been
altered between the time it was written by the physician and received by the pharmacist.
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It was expected that the system would not be expensive to develop or use. It was also

expected that the majority of the users (physicians and pharmacists) would be reluctant to
embrace the technology, however, younger and more computer literate users, as well as
those users who perceive that a significant problem with prescription drug fraud already
exists, would be more likely to accept and utilize the technology.
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Chapter II
Review of Literature
Overview of the Literature for Public-Key Cryptography
The birth of public-key cryptography can be traced back to 1976 when Diffie and
Hellman published their landmark article entitled New Directions in Cryptography in

IEEE Transactions on Information Theory (Diffie, 1976). Their article proposed the use
of two passwords in order to encrypt and decrypt messages. One would be a private
password, known only to the recipient, the other would be the public password, known to
everyone and used by the sender of the message. This landmark paper was followed in
1977 by Ron Rivest's, Adi Shamir's, and Leonard Adleman's paper A Methodfor

Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-key Cryptosystems in Communications of the
ACM (Rivest, 1978). The RSA system, as it is now known, refined the asymmetric
encryption technique and allowed seamless bi-directional encryption. Using this method,
encrypted messages can be sent and decoded by the recipient in an identical manner to the
schema that Diffie proposed; however, the holder ofthe private password also had the
capability of sending messages encrypted with the private password that could be
decoded using the public-key. Using this technique, the first truly valid system for using
secure digital signatures was available. This system is the key technology that enables
the theoretical model proposed in this dissertation to work, since public-key cryptography
would protect the contents of the prescription from being read by an unauthorized user
when it is traveling on the public network, and it would prevent any individual from
changing the contents of the prescription.
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Most of the articles pertaining to cryptography written between 1976 and 1989
discussed advances and theories building upon Diffie's and Rivest's public-key
cryptographic and asymmetric security techniques and improving the existing algorithms.
Brillhart presented research in 1988 on the factorizations of the large numbers used in
public-key cryptography (Brillhart, 1988). This work was expanded upon in 1989 with
research into factorization and primality testing (Bressoud, 1979) and Bilham and
Shamir's work into differential cryptanalysis (Bilham, 1990) which lead to the formation
of the DES data encryption standard (Bilham, 1993). LaMacchia and Odlyzko worked
on the computation of discrete logarithms in prime number fields (LaMacchia, 1991).
Lenstra and Manasse investigated factoring theory using two large prime numbers
(Lenstra, 1991). In 1995, Odlyzko published his theories on the future of integer
factorization as it applied to cryptography (Odlyzko, 1995). This research is significant
because if the prime numbers used in the creation of the key can be determined, the
cryptographic system would be compromised.
In 1994, Bellare and Rogaway succeeded in optimizing the algorithms used to
convert plain text to cipher text, and visa-versa (Bellare, 1994). This was important due
to the system overhead that the encryption process required, resulting in time delays for
transmitting and receiving data in an asymmetric environment and is significant with
respect to the theoretical model proposed in this dissertation. If the user of a public key
cryptographic system experiences a significant delay in the processing of their data, it
would reduce his or her productivity and they would be less likely to use this type of
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system. For documents the size of a prescription, and given that the rate of transactions
will not exceed a few per hour, efficiency will not be an issue with this system.
There has been research into several potential problems with public-key
cryptographic systems. One problem is that the private keys can be compromised
through a variety of means. For example, the holder of the private key could leave the
key, in an unencrypted format, on his or her machine (Blakley, 1979). Another problem
with a public-key system is that header information is sent in an unencrypted format.
This information can be scanned in a public network and, using filtering technology, key
packets can be intercepted. Blum and Goldwasser published their work on a revision to
the public-key cryptographic schema that hides header information (Blum, 1984).
Research was published detailing the results of attacks on the integrity of public-key
cryptographic systems. Shamir attempted to use a polynomial-time algorithm for
breaking basic asymmetric cryptographic systems (Shamir, 1984). It is interesting to note
that he selected the Merkle-Hellman system as the basis of his research and not a "pure"
asymmetric cryptographic system such as RSA (which he invented). A year later,
Desmedt and Odlyzko published the results of their research that unsuccessfully used
discrete logarithm schemes in order to break the security of the system (Desmedt, 1985).
Coppersmith and a team of researchers at IBM's Watson Research Laboratories in 1992
had similar results using a variety of computer attacks and revalidated the strength of the
public-key cryptographic system against these external threats (Coppersmith, 1992).
Maurer theorized that the asymmetric protocol could be broken using discrete logarithms
(Maurer, 1994). Matsui and Yamagishi's investigated plaintext attacks based on a cipher
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(Matsui, 1992). There was even a challenge that RSA put forth to the outside world,
inviting mathematicians, scientists, and hackers to attempt to break the system. The
result of the "RSA Factoring Challenge" was published in 1995 and the system withstood
all attempts to break the code (Fahn, 1995). Based on this extensive research, the use of a
public-key cryptographic methodology is a reliable and safe tool to use for encrypting
and ensuring the integrity of the contents of the prescriptions that are transmitted using
the theoretical model proposed in this dissertation when using keys of suitable length. As
computers become more powerful, the length of the key must increase in order to
maintain this same degree of reliability.
While the previous research focuses on the reliability of the encrypted message in
terms of decoding and changing of contents, much of the work related to authentication
of the sender and non-repudiation of data was not published until the late 1980's. The
focus of this research was performed in the area of digital signatures. This was the
precursor to the use of asymmetric cryptographic systems as the basis for electronic
commerce authorization and validation. Using this approach, the holder of the private
password sends an authorization to perform a transaction and the recipient uses the public
key to authenticate the transaction.
The first major research into the specific topic of non-repudiation was published
by Chaum in 1989. His work showed that public-key cryptography was a valid system
for proving that an individual sent a given transmission (Chaum, 1989). He published an
expanded analysis of this theory in 1992 (Chaum, 1992). He also showed, in 1991, that
public-key cryptography was a valid system for group signatures and that keys could be
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established that have a single public key, and multiple private keys (Chaum, 1991). This
approach can be applied to the theoretical system, where now, for the first time,
paradigms could be established where more than one physician's "signature" would be
needed to issue a prescription (or certain types of prescriptions). While this type of
system is not currently used, it illustrates that the proposed model offers flexibility to
meet many potential future requirements.
Diffie, the inventor of asymmetric cryptography, also published research on the
authentication of keys used in public-key cryptographic systems (Diffie, 1992). Schnorr
made refinements to the basic asymmetric model and developed a methodology to use
this system in both "smart card" technology (Schnorr, 1990) and data exchange models
and EDI (Schnorr, 1991). This research has shown that public-key cryptography is a
valid and reliable methodology for authenticating the sender of a message and for
insuring the non-repudiation of the contents of the message. It is therefore an appropriate
methodology for use in the theoretical model proposed in this dissertation.
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The Contribution This Study Will Make to the Field

The foundation of research on this topic has focused on the areas of using publickey cryptography as a mathematical model and encryption system and the integrity of
that system. More recent research has begun to focus on the issue digital signatures. The
first practical systems resulting from this technology have been related to electronic
commerce systems. These systems are becoming prolific in our daily lives and include
on-line banking, stock, credit card, and other financial transaction systems.
There has been no research performed in the area of applying this technology to
address the problem with prescription drug fraud, nor have there been any significant
advances in methods to reduce prescription drug fraud other than the use of three-part
safety paper by the physician when he issues the scrip (Weikel, 1996). This dissertation
provides a new, practical, ethical, legal, and economically viable use of this technology to
address a significant societal problem. It builds upon the foundation of previous research,
establishes a model that can be reproduced and validated, and incorporates original
survey data as to the likely acceptance or rejection of this model by the two key user
communities (physicians and pharmacists).
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Chapter III
Methodology
Research Methods and Procedures That Were Employed
The methodology for this project was broken down into several tracks. Each track
had several tasks that were performed sequentially. This section of the report outlines the
methodologies that were used to complete the project, broken down by track and task.
The track topics included the preliminary investigation, survey of user acceptance, public
key cryptography, system prototyping/modeling, costlbenefit analysis and summary
analysis of data.

Preliminary Investigation
The preliminary investigation component involved a series of progressive
investigations with continually narrowing scope. The problem of prescription drug fraud
was the first topic to be investigated. Government reports were examined to detail the
extent of the problem in terms of cost, patterns, and methodologies of prescription fraud.
Required elements of a prescription were identified in order to determine the necessary
fields that would be required by the proposed database, software programs, and electronic
data interchange (EDI) import and export files. Legal constraints were examined by
reviewing federal and state law, in order to determine if any legislative or regulatory
hurdles would need to be overcome.
The second area of investigation was to research potential solutions that can
address the problem and the disk and network medium in which to transmit the
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information. This involved focusing the investigation on the topic of public-key
cryptography and was accomplished by conducting a comprehensive literature survey.
Based on these findings a prototype system was designed that incorporates PKCS
technology for transmitting and authenticating prescription drug data that is sent between
pharmacists and physicians.

Survey of User Acceptance
Further investigation was required to determine the likelihood of the acceptance
of the system by pharmacists and physicians. Since there was no previous research in this
area, an original survey instrument was designed to address this topic. Using Gay's
criteria for analyzing a statistically significant sample of data (Gay, 1992), and
anticipating a ten to twenty percent rate of return ofthe surveys, the user acceptance
survey was sent to 500 physicians and 500 pharmacists in September 1998. The
recipients of the survey are located in five geographic regions (west, south, northeast,
southeast, and mid-west). The survey is presented in appendices A and B. The results of
the survey data can easily be reproduced by having a subsequent researcher simply resend the same survey to different physicians and pharmacists. The expectation is that if
the sample of physicians and pharmacists is sufficiently representative of the population,
the results should be nearly identical. The survey does not contain any identifying data.
The initial survey yielded a response of 13% from the physicians (P=68) and a return rate
of 18% (P=88) from the pharmacists. The survey was sent to an additional 200
physicians and 150 pharmacists in November of 1998 and the responses were received
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until a total of 100 responses were received from the physicians (P= 100) and 100
responses were received from the pharmacists (P= 100). The data was tabulated in each
tracked category (geographic region, age, cost, etc.). Separate tabulations were done for
pharmacists and for physicians.
The results of the survey data answer two sets of questions. First, the results
show the likely acceptance rate based on demographic factors. This information would
be useful if the system were deployed, since the organization that would be implementing
the system can base their strategic marketing, training programs, and support
organizations based upon the likely resistance or acceptance of specific potential users.
For example, ifusers in the southern region of the country were more resistant to this
type of technology, training and support service centers could be concentrated in that
geographic region. The factors measured include likely acceptance based upon age, years
in practice, gender, geographic region, perception as to the extent of prescription drug
fraud, medical specialty, method of prescription issuance/receipt, computerization status,
computer literacy, and system cost. The survey also answers the questions regarding
desired system functions by asking physicians and pharmacists to rank the most
important features that they wish to have incorporated into the system.

Public Key Cryptography
Once the information on the use of compatible public-key cryptography and
Internet technologies was determined, a survey of existing products needed to be
performed to ascertain which specific product, if any, can meet the requirements of the
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theoretical model proposed in this dissertation. Existing commercial products were
analyzed to determine product compatibility and suitability for the intended purpose by
comparing the product's features and functionality with the requirements identified by the
survey results and the preliminary investigation. Kochanski worked on comparing the
features of these products (Kochanski, 1987). Other sources of information included
Informationweek (Davis, 1998) and the Usenet Cryptographic Discussion Group (MIT,
1998). In addition to these sources, product literature and manufacturer's web sites were
used to determine the feasibility of specific product candidates. The cost to acquire,
install, and maintain these products was also determined, using these same sources, and
.used in the cost analysis section in the summary track. Compatible interface options were
recorded and used in the prototype system. Required features that are not available in the
commercial product offerings needed to be custom coded using a high-level
programming language.
Once the data was obtained from the survey, the features desired by the physicians
and pharmacists had to be incorporated into the system. This would increase the
likelihood of the potential users accepting the system. The features desired by the user
needed to be evaluated against any technological, cost, or system limitations that might
exist. Features that can be incorporated into the proposed system, based upon this
criteria, were then incorporated into a system model.
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System Prototyping and Modeling
The first step was to develop a model and diagram of the system detailing the
conceptual system model using the standard system documentation conventions for the
development lifecycle methodology (Whitten, 1994). The model and diagram was a
high-level hierarchical flow chart outlining the major processing steps and data-flows for
the proposed system, along with a written narrative explaining each major process. Dataflow diagrams were the best method to illustrate the hierarchical data flow since they
clearly illustrate and explain each major component of the system and provide a highlevel visual overview of the path that the data takes through each of the major processes
within the system. The data-flow diagrams also facilitated the creation of the prototype
system. There were six diagrams that were created:
•

Data-flow diagram for creating public-private keys.

4&

Data-flow diagram for the Physician's Program when creating a prescription.

4&

Data-flow diagram for the Administration Program when creating and
transmitting a prescription to the Pharmacy.

•

Data-flow diagram for the Pharmacy Program when validating and dispensing
a prescription.

..

Data-flow diagram for the Administration Program when transmitting filled
prescription data back to the Physician.

4&

Data-flow diagram of the Physician's system after the prescription is
dispensed.
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Next, a prototype of the system was set up using the previously identified
software public-key cryptographic and Internet tools. The system prototype contained a
physician's screen interface and a separate pharmacist's screen interface. These programs
were developed using BASIC, a high-level application programming language, compiled
into binary code that can be used in either a Windows or DOS environment. PGP, a
public domain public-key cryptographic tool, was used for encryption. The data in the
prototype system can be manually transmitted between the physician's interface and the
pharmacist's interface. An intermediary Application Program served as the controller
and performed audit and tracking functions; however, it was not fully developed due to
the high cost of creating the extensive code required to make this program operational.
The Administration Program, however, is able to maintain keys for a small number of
physicians and pharmacists so that simulations can be executed in a real-time
environment. These limitations are identified within the dissertation and did not limit or
materially affect the functionality of the prototype system. Sample prescriptions can be
created, encrypted, transmitted, audited, and decrypted using the model system. The
model can provide additional metric data for human computer interaction testing in the
event the prototype system is ever commercialized.

CostlBenefit Analysis and Summary Analysis of Data
The final track of tasks related to the analysis of data and the cost of
implementing the system. This task required the assessment of the acquisition,
installation, and maintenance data for implementation of this theoretical system. This
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data was compared to the estimated cost and economic loss data obtained from
government reports relating to lost productivity due to prescription drug fraud. The
question to be answered was: do the benefits ofthe proposed system outweigh the costs?
Implementation and operation costs were compared with the estimated economic costs of
doing nothing. Intangible benefits that result from the implementation of this system
were also discussed. This task included presentation of known data such as a reduction in
the death rate or drug overdose emergency room incidents due to elimination of
prescription drug fraud.
Costs were computed for development and deployment. Recurring costs (such as
maintenance and Internet access and usage fees) were also estimated. Development costs
included the cost to develop the centralized Administration Program and the pharmacy
and physician interface programs, and the cost of any third-party commercial code or
licenses that is required in order to make the core interfaces operational. Deployment
costs included the cost to deploy the required hardware and software on a per-physician
and per-pharmacist basis. This fee included installation, hardware, software, and thirdparty licenses (e.g. PGP) that would be required on a per-seat basis. Maintenance,
support, telecommunications, and overhead costs were also computed in order to
determine the recurring system cost.

Formats for Presenting Results
The prototype system was presented as a stand-alone computer application with a
pharmacist interface and a physician interface. The physician interface was an interactive
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screen and menu system that allows prescription data entry, modification, deletion,
encryption, and transmission. The pharmacist interface was an interactive screen and
menu system that allows prescription receipt, decryption, authentication, and export to
the pharmacist's internal computer system.
The survey data was analyzed by the demographics of the respondents, and the
data was analyzed to find positive relationships related to experience, age, sex, familiarity
with computers, extent of computerization within the existing office environment,
economic factors, geographic region, economic status of patient populations, system
functions, and the physician's or pharmacist's perception as to the extent of prescription
fraud. The purpose of the analysis was to determine the pharmacist's or physician's
willingness to accept this type of cryptographic system.
Data was presented numerically and graphically for the following areas:
..

Current Practices and Procedures

..

Extent of Automation and Computerization

..

Acceptance of a Public-Key Cryptographic System

•

Desired System Functions

The cost data was presented in a standard format detailing the individual
pharmacist's and physician's unit cost for the system. Unit cost included the cost of
acquiring and implementing the system, as well as an overhead cost allocation for the
expenses required to administer the system (this cost included monthly recurring fees,
such as the Internet connectivity fee). The costs were compared to the known negative
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economic costs incurred by government and quasi-government agencies that are related to
prescription drug fraud.

Projected Outcomes
The projected outcome was that the prototype system would provide a secure and
accurate transmission and authentication of the prescription data, as well as the
authentication and validation of the sender. Since this project develops a new application
using existing technology, there was a strong probability that the technical goal would be
achieved.
The survey data was expected to show that physicians will be very reluctant to use
the system. Also, the survey data was expected to show that physicians will be more
willing to use this system if they practice in areas where the perceived incidence of
prescription drug fraud is high, where the physicians have a high degree of computer
literacy, where the age of the physician is lower, where the physicians already have
computers in their home or office, and when the cost of the system is low. The survey
data was also expected to show no difference in acceptance criteria based on age or
geographic region. The results of the data for the pharmacists was expected to parallel
that of the physicians. All of these factors were measured using the data that was
obtained by the survey.
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Chapter IV
Results
Findings and Data Analysis

Numerous methods have been used over the past few decades to reduce the
incidence of prescription drug fraud in the United States. All of these methods made use
of a paper-based prescription system and physicians have resisted incorporating these
procedures into their daily medical practice (Weikel, 1996). Even with three-part
prescription pads and using special tamper-resistant paper issued by government
agencies, the amount of prescription drugs sold illegally in the United States exceeds
twenty-five billion dollars a year (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1998a). The
mechanics of prescription forgery can take place by a variety of means including using
stolen prescription blanks, altering valid prescriptions by changing quantities and/or
strengths of the prescribed drugs, and telephoning the prescription to a pharmacist with
the caller falsely representing themselves as a licensed physician. All of these problems
are related to written or verbal conveyance of the prescription information between the
physician and the pharmacist.
By having physicians and pharmacists use an electronic public-key cryptographic
system, prescription drug fraud can be greatly reduced or eliminated. A PKCS ensures
confidentiality, authentication, non-repudiation, integrity of data, access control, and high
availability (Bhimani, 1996). Even though PKCS addresses the mechanics of security
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and integrity of the data, there are other considerations that must be taken into account in
order for the system to be successful. In order for this system to work, it must be:
..

Mandated by government or a regulating body for use by all pharmacists and
physicians. The system must be ubiquitous. The physician must know that

every pharmacy has the capability of reading his electronic PKCS
prescription.
..

Have a central administrative mechanism to administer the system and
prevent duplicate issuance ofprescriptions. Passwords need to be maintained,

changed, and administered. A central authority must be responsible for
deploying the system, setting standards, performing helpdesk functions, and
maintaining the infrastructure of the system.
..

Contain the information that is essential to issue a prescription. A survey of

existing research shows that the essential elements of a prescription consists of
only ten elements:
•

The physician's name and address.

..

The date of the prescription.

•

The physician's license or DEA number.

•

The patient's name.

•

The quantity of the drug to be dispensed.

•

The name of the drug to be dispensed.

•

The strength/dosage of the drug to be dispensed.

•

The instructions for taking the drug to be dispensed.
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..

It

The number of refills permitted for the drug to be dispensed.

It

The physician's signature.

Easy and fast to use. A physician writes a prescription in a matter of a few

seconds. Any system that takes a significantly longer period of time will not
be accepted.
•

Inexpensive. Physicians pay little or nothing for prescription blanks. They

will not be willing to accept a system that costs them more money to perform
the same function that they are achieving using the current system (see survey
results).
•

Incorporate adequate levels ofsecurity. PKCS systems have differing levels

of security depending upon the key length. A minimum key length of 128 bits
is required in order to protect the integrity of the PKCS system from external
attack using existing technology and computers.
..

Run on almost any type of computer system and transmit and receive data in a
common format. Physicians and pharmacists use a variety of computer

systems. The proposed system must function on a wide variety of machines in
order to minimize the deployment cost and gain acceptance.

A review of existing federal and state law shows no restriction on the method by
which this information is conveyed from the physician to the pharmacist. Actual practice
varies from written prescriptions on special 3-part safety paper, to using photocopied
prescription blanks containing space for the essential elements of the prescription data, to
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simply having the physician or his/her representative call the prescription into the
pharmacist by telephone.

Survey- Findings and Data Analysis
A survey was conducted in order to determine the

li~ely

acceptance of the

theoretical model proposed in this dissertation. In September of 1998 the survey was sent
to 500 physicians and 500 pharmacists throughout the United States. Sixty-five
responses were received from physicians and eighty responses were received from
pharmacists. A second mailing was sent in November of 1998 to 200 physicians and 150
pharmacists. Responses were accepted until a total of 100 responses were received from
physicians and 100 responses were received from pharmacists. The data was tabulated
into categories and summarized into fourteen charts that follow. The following is a
summary of the results that are reported in each figure.
Figure 2 shows the survey results of the likely acceptance of the proposed system
based upon the pharmacist's and physician's age. Ages were categorized into ten-year
ranges. The results show that pharmacists, rather than physicians, are far more likely to
accept the proposed system. By age 30,90% of the pharmacists responding indicated that
they would accept the proposed system. The acceptance among pharmacists steadily
declines as the age of the respondent increases. By age 60, only 57% of the pharmacists
indicated that they would accept the proposed system.
Overall, physicians were less likely to accept the proposed system than
pharmacists. The results show that up to age 30, 65% of the respondents indicated that

Figure 2
Acceptance of a Prescription Drug Public-Key Cryptographic System by
Physicians and Pharmacists, Based on Age
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Figure 3
Acceptance ofa Prescription Drug Public-Key Cryptographic System by
Physicians and Pharmacists, Based on Years in Practice
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they would accept the proposed system. The acceptance level increases as the age of the
respondent increases, up to age 40, then steadily decreases. By age 60, slightly more than
20% of the physicians indicated that they would accept the proposed system.
Figure 3 shows acceptance of the system based on the measurement of "years in
practice". The results are nearly identical to the results illustrated in Figure 2 presumably
because "years in practice" is highly correlated with age. Pharmacists are far more likely
to accept the proposed system. As they enter practice, 90% of the respondents indicated
that they would accept the proposed system. The acceptance among pharmacists steadily
declines as the age of the respondent increases. After 40 years in practice, only 30% of
the pharmacists indicated that they would accept the proposed system.
The results show that as they start practice, 55% of the physicians indicated that
they would accept the proposed system. The acceptance level increases as the experience
of the respondent increases, up to 10 years in practice, then steadily decreases. After 40
years in practice, 15% of the physicians indicated that they would accept the proposed
system.
Figure 4 illustrates the likely acceptance of the system by pharmacists and
physicians based upon gender. The results show that 60% of the male pharmacists
responding to the survey would accept the system as compared with 65% of the female
pharmacists indicating that they would accept the system. The results also show that
slightly more than 40% of the male physicians would accept the system, as compared
with 62% of the female physicians.

Figure 4
Acceptance of a Prescription Drug Public-Key Cryptographic System by
Physicians and Pharmacists, Based on Gender
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Figure 5
Acceptance ofa Prescription Drug Public-Key Cryptographic System by
Physicians and Pharmacists, Based on Geographic Region
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Figure 5 illustrates the likely acceptance of the system by geographic region. The
results show that more than 60% of the pharmacists in the Northeast, Southeast, and
Western regions were likely to accept the system, while only 40% of the pharmacists in
the South and Midwest were likely to accept the system.
Slightly more than 45% of the physicians in the Northeast were likely to accept
the system. There was low physician acceptance in all other regions except the Western
region, where 55% of the physicians were likely to accept the system. Since the use of
computer systems is highest in the western geographic area, the high rate of acceptance of
this system by physicians is likely to be related to their familiarity and experience with
computers.
Figure 6 illustrates the likely acceptance of the system based upon the medical
practice specialty of the physician. The results show that the highest acceptance would
be among Emergency Medicine physicians. General Practitioners, Family Practitioners,
and Internists had moderate acceptance rates in the 40% range. Orthopedic and Surgeons
has the lowest acceptance rate in the 25% range.
Figure 7 illustrates likely acceptance of the system based upon the physician's
self-assessment as to the extent of prescription drug fraud. Physician's that perceived that
fraud was not an extensive problem were likely to have a low acceptance (30%).
Physician's had a moderate acceptance (50%) of the system when they perceived that
prescription drug fraud existed at a moderate rate. Surprisingly, physicians were less
likely to accept the system (40% acceptance) when they had a perception of a high degree
of drug prescription fraud.

Figure 6
Acceptance of a Prescription Drug Public-Key Cryptographic System by
Physicians, Based on Medical Specialty
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Acceptance ofa Prescription Drug Public-Key Cryptographic System by
Physicians, Based on Perception of Prescription Fraud
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Figure 8 illustrates likely acceptance of the system based upon the pharmacist's
self-assessment as to the extent of prescription drug fraud. Pharmacists who perceived
that prescription drug fraud was not an extensive problem were likely to have a moderate
acceptance (60%). Pharmacists had a high acceptance (70%) of the system when their
perception of the problem with. prescription drug fraud was at a moderate rate.
Surprisingly, pharmacists were less likely to accept the system (50% acceptance) when
they had a perception of a high degree of prescription drug fraud.
Figure 9 illustrates likely acceptance of the system based upon prior incidents
involving prescription drug fraud that existed within the physician's or pharmacist's
practice. Physicians who previously experienced an incident of prescription drug fraud
within their practice were likely to accept the system (55%), versus an acceptance level of
less than 30% for physicians who have not had a prior incident of prescription drug fraud.
Data from pharmacists paralleled that of the physicians, with 70% of the pharmacists who
had a previous incident of prescription drug fraud within their practice indicating that
they would accept the system, as compared with an acceptance level of less than 50% for
those who have not had a previous incident of prescription drug fraud within their
practice.
Figure 10 illustrates the likely acceptance of the system by pharmacists and
physicians based upon the primary method of prescription issuance or receipt. The
results show that there was no difference in the likely acceptance of the system (60%) by
pharmacists, based upon the primary means (written or by telephone) by which they
receive prescriptions. The results among physicians paralleled those of the pharmacists.

Figure 8
Acceptance ofa Prescription Drug Public-Key Cryptographic System by
Pharmacists, Based on Perception of Prescription Fraud
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Figure 9
Acceptance ofa Prescription Drug Public-Key Cryptographic System by
Physicians and Pharmacists, Based on Previous Occurrences of
Prescription Fraud Within Their Practice
OIl

c
+::

'" ...
... .sc.
....'"c ...
...
.~

"0

C

~

C

80

~

60

]<

40

o PHYSICIANS

0:

0
:>.
c."'~ 20
~::3

....
0

~

iii PHARMACISTS
Yes

No

Don't KnowlN 0
Reply

Previous Occurance of Prescription Drug
Fraud Within the Physician's or
Pharmacist's Practice

50

The results show that there was no difference in the likely acceptance of the system
(30%) by physicians, based upon the primary means (written or telephone) by which they
receive prescriptions.
Figure 11 illustrates the likely acceptance of the system by pharmacists and
physicians based upon computerization status. The results show that pharmacists with
both a computer and Internet connection within their offices were the most likely to
accept the system (80%), followed by pharmacists with just a computer available in their
office (70%), followed by pharmacists with a home computer (62%). Among
pharmacists whose homes were not computerized, only 42% were likely to accept the
system. For pharmacists whose offices were not computerized, less than 5% were likely
to accept the system.
Among physicians, the results show that physicians with both a computer and
Internet connection within their offices were the most likely to accept the system (62%),
followed by physicians with just a computer available in their office (44%), followed by
physicians with a home computer (41 %). Among physicians whose homes were not
computerized, only 19% were likely to accept the system. For physicians whose offices
were not computerized, only 22% were likely to accept the system.
Figure 12 illustrates the likely acceptance of the system by pharmacists and
physicians based upon a self-assessment oftheir computer familiarity. The results show
that there was increasing acceptance of the system by pharmacists as their computer
familiarity-level increased, with 45% of the pharmacists indicating likely acceptance of
the system when their computer familiarity-level was low, 62% indicating likely

. Figure 10
Acceptance ofa Prescription Drug Public-Key Cryptographic System by
Physicians and Pharmacists, Based on the Method of Prescription
Issuance or Receipt
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Acceptance ofa Prescription Drug Public-Key Cryptographic System by
Physicians and Pharmacists, Based on Computerization Status
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acceptance when their familiarity-level was moderate, and 72% indicating likely
acceptance when their familiarity-level was high. The results among physicians
paralleled those of the pharmacists. The results show that there was increasing
acceptance of the system by physicians as their computer familiarity-level increased with
21 % ofthe physicians indicating likely acceptance of the system when their computer
familiarity-level was low, 40% indicating likely acceptance when their familiarity-level
was moderate, and 51 % indicating likely acceptance when their familiarity-level was
high.
Figure 13 illustrates the likely acceptance of the system by pharmacists and
physicians based upon their contribution to system cost (purchase price). The results
show that there was decreasing acceptance of the system as the system price increased
with 65% of the pharmacists indicating likely acceptance of the system when the cost was
$0. Acceptance steadily decreased until only 5% of the pharmacists indicated that they
would be willing to accept the system at a cost of $2,000. The results among physicians
paralleled those of the pharmacists. The results show that there was decreasing
acceptance of the system as the system price increased. 48% of the physicians indicated
likely acceptance of the system when the cost was $0, with acceptance steadily
decreasing until only 10% of the physicians indicated that they would be willing to accept
the system at a cost of $2,000.
Figure 14 illustrates the eight most important system functions selected by
physicians who responded to the survey. The most desired function was the ability to
eliminate altered and forged prescriptions, with 100% of the physicians selecting this

Figure 12
Acceptance of a Prescription Drug Public-Key Cryptographic System by
Physicians and Pharmacists, Based on Computer Familiarity
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function as their first, second, or third choice. This was followed by eliminating
unauthorized prescription issuance by phone, eliminating forged prescriptions using the
physician's name, auditing prescriptions issued under the physician's name, obtaining the
system at little or no cost, insuring the prescription is only seen by the pharmacist, using a
computer as a tool to write prescriptions, and verifying that the prescription had actually
been filled.
Figure 15 illustrates the six most important system functions as ranked by
pharmacists who responded to the survey. The most desired function was the ability to
eliminate altered and forged prescriptions, with 100% of the pharmacists selecting this
function as their first, second, or third choice. This was followed by reducing the amount
of time the pharmacist spent on the phone with the physician (or physician's office),
being able to obtain the system at little or no cost, ensuring that the prescription data is
only seen by the physician, and allowing the physician to verify that the prescription had
been filled.

Technical Provisions- Findings and Data Analysis
The next step was to identify the technical provisions required to build the
theoretical model. There were seven areas covered by this part of the project. The first
area is the transmission medium. There were two options that were evaluated. The first
was asynchronous dial-up into a proprietary network. This option was eliminated due to
the enormous cost of creating a nationwide network that can support the thousands of
pharmacists and physicians that would be using the system. The second option was the

Figure 14
Ranking of the Eight Most Important System Functions in a Prescription
Drug Public-Key Cryptographic System, as Indicated by Physicians
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Internet. This medium was selected due to its low cost, the ability to communicate with
disparate systems, the many "points of presence" that exist within every state in the
United States, and the fault tolerance and redundancy that are an integral part of the
Internet itself. The major obstacle that this technology presents is the issue of security;
however, PKCS adequately addresses this concern by the high level of security associated
with its encryption algorithms.
Even when the Internet is used as a seamless electronic transfer medium, there
will be occasions when the Internet cannot be used. There are two main cases. The first
is that the patient does not know, at the time the prescription is written, which pharmacy
he intends to use. The second is when there is a system failure with the Internet or the
administrative or control programs. In these cases, the prescription can be saved to a
floppy diskette. The pharmacist's computer can perform the same authentication on the
diskette as it would to the Internet file that it receives electronically. In the event the
physician's PC is not operating, a policy decision would have to be made. The first
option is that the physician writes a manual prescription and then pharmacist telephones
the physician's office for verification. The second is that the physician will not be
permitted to issue a prescription until the system is repaired. From a practical standpoint,
the former option is preferable. Since PC crashes will be the exception, rather than the
rule, it would not be unreasonable for the physician to expect to verbally verify the few
prescriptions that would be issued during the interim period that would exist until his
system is functional.
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The hardware requirements were identified next. Physicians and pharmacists are
likely to utilize a wide variety of disparate computers, using a multitude of operating
systems and processors. The system would also have to integrate with existing computer
systems that are already installed in physician's and pharmacist's offices. It was
determined that in order for the system to be functional, the PKCS would need to run on a .
Windows compatible system that utilizes a 386 or faster processor with at least 4Mb of
memory. This minimum requirements are satisfied by at least 90% of the existing
computers that currently exist in the market, and 100% of all new computer systems that
are currently being sold (Microdesign Resources, 1998).
Modem requirements would be minimal as well. In fact, due to the small amount
of prescription data being passed through the system, a 1200 baud modem would provide
adequate user access speed.
Security and authentication is addressed through a technology that ensures
confidentiality, authentication, nonrepudiation, integrity of data, access control, and high
availability (Bhimani, 1996). A public-key cryptographic software system that uses at
least a 128-bit keys meets this requirement. Since the amount of data that would be
transmitted for a prescription would be rather minimal (l0 fields, plus routing
information), even lower-end computers would not experience a significant delay in the
process of encrypting and decrypting the messages.
In order for the system to work, there must be a maintenance and administrative
control authority. This entity would serve five functions. First, it would be the repository
of the public keys. Second, it would provide help-desk function to the users of the
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system. Third, it would provide a unique identification number to each prescription that
passes through the system in order to eliminate the possibility of a prescription being
routed to more than one pharmacist. Fourth, it would provide maintenance for the
software and take care of any of the financial and billing issues with the users of the
system. Finally, it would have the capability of capturing the prescription data (without
the identifying patient information) for sale to interested third parties, such as
pharmaceutical companies.
After the general technical requirements were identified, a search was performed
to identify existing commercial products that could meet the requirements. There were
no commercial programs that provided the necessary software for the physician's
interface, pharmacist's interface, or administrative control program. There were,
however, programs that provided the public-key maintenance function. The most suitable
program was PGP by PGP, Inc. (PGP, 1997). This program was released to the publicdomain for free use. It provides user-selected levels of encryption and can be configured
to search for the keys on an Internet Key Server or local computer. It will run on any
windows or DOS platform and is fully Internet-enabled.
The software application required to run with this system must be custom
designed. The ten required elements of the prescription that were presented earlier in this
report would need to be coded into the system. Since physicians and pharmacists are a
unique group of individuals, the user interface of the theoretical system would be of
particular importance. There is a variety of research in the field of Human Computer
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Interaction (HCI). In Brown's (1994) text on the social and material issues of HumanComputer Interaction and design, he points out:
Trying to define new practices without reference to user's past insights, common
institutions, shared understandings, and hard-won experience is actually far more
difficult than grappling with context.

This is particularly true when dealing with physicians, who share all of these
traits. Baecker (1995) references this challenge and suggests using HoItzbatt and Beyer's
(1993) method ofHCI analysis. This method uses iterative construction and discussion,
by development teams consisting of IT personnel and users and proposes five work
models that can be used in the construction of the system and HCI interface. These
models include:
..

Context Models- Organizational culture, policies, procedures that affect work.

..

Physical Models- The physical environment as it impacts work.

..

Flow Models- The major roles and communication paths at work.

..

Sequence Models- The temporal sequences of important activities in a setting.

..

Abstract Flow Models- Composites used to discuss possible changes in work
practice (Baecker, 1995).

It was decided that the flow and sequence models would be created using

Whitten's modem systems development life cycle (MSDLC) (Whitten, 1994). The
physical and abstract flow models would then be the result of the flow and sequence
model. There is scope for improvements in the interface design that may be addressed in
the design of the actual system.
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System Model
The proposed system contains three separate programs that need to be modeled.
The first is the physician's program and is used to write the prescription, encrypt its
contents, transmit it to the Internet (or transfer it to a floppy diskette), and receive
information regarding when the prescription was filled and what drug was actually
dispensed. The second program is referred to as the Administration Program (AP). This
program maintains the list of the physician's and pharmacy's authorized public-keys,
receives all prescriptions that are issued and assigns them unique ID numbers in order to
prevent electronic prescriptions from being filled by more than one pharmacy, and
captures information on the drug that was actually dispensed. The third program is the
pharmacist's program which receives the prescription information, authenticates its
contents and its sender, and receives the input of the information on the drug that was
actually dispensed.
In order to better explain and illustrate the core functions within each of these
systems, the models for each major process are presented in this section. Each square
represents a major system function and illustrates the flow of the data as it moves from
one high-level function to the next. The flow diagrams were also the design basis for the
prototype system.
Figure 16 details the data-flow for creating public-private password keys. The
purpose of this process is to create the initial electronic account for the physician or
pharmacist and to establish a repository for the public keys. The first step in this process
is the one-time authentication of the physician or pharmacy. This is an external manual

Figure 16
Dataflow Diagram for Creating Public-Private Password Keys

Physician or Pharmacy
contacts Administration
Center. Identify of caller is
confirmed.

Physician or Pharmacy's
DEA number is entered into
the database along with a
temporary ID.

jIlillliL-_ _ _ _ _ _ _.........J

Physician or Pharmacy
creates public-private
password key pair.
Temporary ID is transmitted
with new public password.

Temporary ID is verified
against record stored in
database for the given
DEA#.

N~O

,<:<
Physician or Pharmacy
received "invalid message".
and is requested to re-enter
the temporary ID and public

DEA # and temporary ID
are stored in the database.

58

process required in order to establish the account and enable the system to accept the
public password keys.
When the physician or pharmacist's identify is confirmed, an entry is made into
the AP's central database. The physician or pharmacy's account number will be their
DEA number. This number was selected since it is unique and issued by an external
regulating body. A temporary ID# is provided to the physician or pharmacy and entered
into the database.
The physician or pharmacy then uses their desktop system to create a publicprivate password key pair. The public-key is transmitted to the AP computer system,
along with the DEA number and temporary ID. If the temporary ID matches the ID that
was provided to the physician or pharmacy when they were initially authenticated, the
temporary ID is replaced with the public-key and the account is fully activated. The
public-key is made available to all users of the system. Ifthe temporary ID does not
match the ID that was provided to the physician or pharmacy when they were initially
authenticated, they receive an "invalid password message" and the database is not
updated with the public-key. The user must then re-enter the correct information before
the key is accepted.
Figure 17 details the data-flow that is used by the physician's program when he
creates a prescription. In order for this process to work, the physician must have
completed the authentication and password setup process, detailed on the previous page.
The physician enters the prescription information onto a template containing the
essential fields required in order to complete the prescription. The physician then enters

Figure 17
Dataflow Diagram for Creating a Prescription
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their private-key and a digital signature is created and linked to the prescription. If the
pharmacy is known, the public.:key for the pharmacy is selected (the system will
automatically enter the key if the pharmacy is selected from an online list). The system
then encrypts the prescription. If the system is connected to the Internet, the encrypted
prescription and attached .digital signature is transmitted. If the system is not connected
to the Internet, the system attempts to make a connection. If the connection is
established, the encrypted prescription and attached digital signature is transmitted. If the
connection cannot be established, or the pharmacy is not known, the system encrypts the
prescription with the physician's private password and stores it on a floppy diskette
which is given to the patient to bring to the pharmacy of his or her choice. Since the
prescription will not be passing through a public network, it is not necessary to protect
the contents from unauthorized viewing by third parties; however, the contents of the
prescription must still be protected in order to prevent any altering of its contents and to
verify that the physician originated the prescription.
Figure 18 details the data-flow by the AP when a prescription is created. The
purpose of this step is to ensure that prescriptions are not electronically duplicated and
sent to multiple pharmacies. The first step in the process is the receipt of the prescription
by the AP. The prescription is sent to the AP directly by the physician via the Internet, or
sent to the AP via the pharmacy (if the pharmacy received the prescription on a floppy
diskette).

Figure 18
Dataflow for Administration Program When Creating a Prescription
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The prescription is assigned a unique ID number. This process would examine
the'encrypted contents of the message, and based upon the encrypted contents (not
decrypted contents), a unique ID number can be assigned.
The AP program searches its database to see if another prescription containing the
same ID number exists. If not, an entry is made into the database indicating that the
prescription has been submitted and the pharmacy is notified that they may proceed with
the dispensing of the medication. If the ID number for the prescription already exists, the
pharmacy receives an alert indicating that this is an invalid, duplicate prescription, and
the prescription should not be filled. This is an on-line real-time process and should only
take a few seconds to complete.
Figure 19 details the data-flow that the pharmacy program uses when validating
and dispensing a prescription. If the prescription is received on a floppy diskette, the
prescription information is encrypted with the pharmacy's public-key and is sent to the
AP in order to confirm that this is not a duplicate prescription If the prescription is a
duplicate prescription, the pharmacy would be alerted and the prescription would not be
dispensed. If the prescription is not a duplicate, the prescription would then be sent back
to the pharmacy by the AP, via the Internet, the same way that the prescription would be
routed as if it were sent directly by the physician. This is an on-line, real-time process and
should only take a few seconds to complete.
Once a prescription is received by the pharmacy's computer program from the
AP, via the Internet, the prescription is decoded using the pharmacy's private-key. The
physician's signature is then decoded using the physician's public-key. The program

Figure 19
Dataflow for Pharmacy Program When Validating and Dispensing a Prescription
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ensures that the message and digital signature decrypted properly. If they did not, it
means that the message was corrupted during the transmission, the message contents
were altered, or the physician did not enter a valid private-key. In any of these scenarios,
the physician would be notified that the prescription was invalid and the pharmacy would
not dispense the prescription.
If the message and digital signature decrypted properly, the prescription would be
dispensed. The name of the actual drug that was dispensed would be entered into the
pharmacy program. The filled prescription data would then be encrypted with the AP's
public-key and the physician's public-key and transmitted back into the Internet. This
last step would also be performed each time the prescription is refilled, since a separate
prescription is not transmitted for each refill (the initial prescription, once authenticated,
indicates the number of allowable refills).
Figure 20 details the data-flow used by the AP program when the filled
prescription information is sent back to the physician. The filled prescription information
that was sent by the pharmacy program is received via the Internet by the AP program.
The prescription is decrypted using the AP's private-key. The database, containing the
unique ID number for the prescription, is updated, indicating to the system that the
prescription has now been filled.
The AP program captures selected data from the filled prescription. This
information would include the date the prescription was written, the date the prescription
was filled, the physician name, physician ID number, pharmacy name, pharmacy ID
number, drug prescribed, drug strength, quantity prescribed, and drug actually dispensed.

Figure 20
Dataflow for Administration Program When Transmitting Filled Prescription Data Back
to the Physician
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The information is copied to a file for later sale to a third-party. The sale ofthis
information can be used to fund the project on a national scale and is discussed at greater
length in the costlbenefit analysis section of this report. The prescription fill data, still
encrypted with the physician's public-key, is then sent to the physician. This is an online real-time process and would only take a few seconds to complete.
Figure 21 details the data-flow of the filled prescription data that is sent to the
physician's program by the AP. The encrypted prescription fill data would be received
by the physician's system. This process would take place as soon as the physician logs
on to the Internet (this process automatically occurs when the physician sends a
prescription, or the physician can manually logon at any time).
The prescription fill data is then decrypted using the physician's private-key. The
prescription data can then be viewed by the physician and would include the patient's
name, the date the prescription was written, the date the prescription was filled, the
pharmacy name, pharmacy ID number, drug prescribed, quantity prescribed, and drug
actually dispensed.

Prototype System

A functioning prototype system was developed based upon the results of the
research. The purpose of the prototype system was to demonstrate the practical
application of public-key cryptography for the proposed application, as well as to
demonstrate the specific actions that would be taken by a pharmacist or physician using
the system.

Figure 21
Dataflow Diagram of Physician's System After Prescription is Dispensed
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The system was set up with a default application for a fictional physician named
JOHN SMITH. A second default application was set up for a fictional pharmacy named
DRUG FAIR. The prototype system was set up with default names and DEA numbers.
One prescription already exists within the physician's system. The prescription number
in the system is 9900001. An unlimited number of additional prescriptions can be
entered into the prototype system
The PGP key-server was set up with 512-bit key-pairs for two separate
physicians, (JOHN SMITH and PAUL JONES) and key-pairs for two pharmacies
(DRUG FAIR and RITE AID). An unlimited number of additional key-pairs can be
added to the prototype system .
. The prototype system runs in a DOS environment (or a DOS shell under
Windows). The physician's and pharmacist's systems are set up to run on a single pc.
The only PC requirements are that the system have 2 Mb of available disk storage space
on drive "C:" and that the PC use a 386 (or faster) CPU.
The system supports prescription generation, modification, deletion, encryption,
file transmission, decryption, authentication, and drug dispensing functions. The
prototype system does have functional limitations. These limitations include the inability
to automatically save the prescription on a floppy diskette or transmit through the Internet
(although the encrypted prescription can be copied to a floppy diskette and attached to an
Internet e-mail message) and the inability to enter the private-key password and transmit
the prescriptions the moment that they are generated (as opposed to the prototype system
methodology which uses a batch process requiring that the key password for each
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prescription be entered at the time of encryption/decryption). The administration
program, which would be used as the intermediary point if Internet connectivity were
used, is not part of the prototype system (however, the prototype system automatically
generates the unique prescription ID number, which would be one of the key functions of
this system). Other than the limitations specified above, the prototype system performs
all of the key data entry, encryption, decryption, and authentication functions by using
four sets of custom-coded and public-domain programs and ancillary files.
The first set of programs and files is the physician's system and is located within
the c: Iprescrip subdirectory of the prototype system. The following are the key files and
programs used:
•

PROGRAM2.BAS - This is a custom program, written in the BASIC
programming language, that performs the prescription generation,
maintenance, and lookup functions. A list of fields and an instruction guide
for installing and using these programs are contained in appendix D of this
report. A program listing is contained in appendix E of this report;

•

GWBASIC.EXE- This is the BASIC language interpreter. Source code, rather
than object code, is used in the prototype system so that the user can verify
that the program is performing the maintenance operations. Since the program
executes its tasks with sub-second response, compiling the program would not
provide any noticeable increase in speed.

• *.DAT- These are the individual prescription files containing sixteen data
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elements stored in an unencrypted ASCII format. The "*,, file represents a
unique seven digit numeric filename assigned by the computer.
•

CHART.FIL- This is an index file containing the unique prescription number
of each prescription generated by the system.

•

CHART.INF- This is an index file containing the next available unique
prescription number that can be used by the system.

The second set of programs and files is the encryption and decryption software
and is located within the c:lprescrip and c:lprescriplpharma subdirectories of the
prototype system. The following are the key files and programs used:
•

PGP .EXE- This is the public-domain program that performs the public-key
cryptography. The program is PGP v2.6.2 written by Pretty-Good-Privacy,
Inc.

•

SECRING.PGP and PUBRING.PGP- These are the key-rings containing the
public keys and secret keys used to encrypt and decrypt the prescription drug
data used by the physician's and pharmacist's systems.

•

XFERPGP.BAS- This program is written in the BASIC language and contains
the code to find the unencrypted prescription files, code the data and digital
signatures using the PGP .EXE encryption program, and transfer the data to the
pharmacist's program. A program listing is contained in appendix E of this
report.
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•

XFERPGP.BAT- This is a batch file, created after the XFERPGP.BAS
program has been run, that contains the command-level transfer and
encryption commands that is used to code and send the data between the
physician's and pharmacist's systems.

•

XFERPGP3.BAS- This program is written in the BASIC language and
contains the code to find the encrypted prescription files, decode the data and
verify the digital signatures using the PGP.EXE encryption program, and
transfer the data into the pharmacist's program. A program listing is contained
in appendix E of this report.

•

XFERPGP3.BAT- This is a batch file, created after the XFERPGP3.BAS
program has been run, that contains the command-level decryption and
authentication commands that is used to decode and verify the data sent
between the physician's and pharmacist's systems.

• *.PGP- These are the individual encrypted prescriptions that have been
encrypted using the public-key of the pharmacy and the private-key of the
physician.

The third set of programs and files is the pharmacist's system and is located
within the c:lprescriplpharma subdirectory of the prototype system. The following are
the key files and programs used:
•

PROGRAM3.BAS - This is a custom program, written in the BASIC
programming language, that performs the prescription dispensing function.
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The program is able to read the prescription data sent by the physician and
allows the pharmacist to enter the actual drug dispensed data. A list of fields
and an instruction guide for installing and using these programs, are contained
in appendix D of this report. A program listing is contained in appendix E of
this report.
•

GWBASIC.EXE- This is the BASIC language interpreter. .Source code, rather
than object code, is used in the prototype system so that the user can verify
that the program is performing the maintenance operations. Since the program
executes its tasks with sub-second response, compiling the program would not
provide any noticeable increase in speed.

• *.DAT- These are the individual prescriptions containing sixteen data
elements stored in an unencrypted ASCII format. The "*,, file represents a
unique seven digit numeric filename that was assigned by the computer when
the physician's program initially created the prescription.
•

CHART.FIL- This is an index file containing the unique prescription number
of each prescription generated by the system.

The fourth set of programs and files is the Direct Access system. This is a DOS
shell menu system that is available on the commercial market. The Direct Access
program is a series of DOS scripts organized into a user-friendly menu system. The
Direct Access program is located within the c: Ida5 subdirectory of the prototype system.
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The sequence of issuing a prescription with the prototype system, encrypting and
digitally signing it, decrypting and authenticating it, and dispensing the. medication would
be as follows:
1- The physician enters the prescriptions using the physician's program. He
specifies the patient names, medication information, and the name of the
pharmacy that will be dispensing the medication. The system defaults to
"JOHN SMITH" as the name of the physician. Another physician's name can
be used to overwrite this information.
2- The physician selects the encrypt and transmit option. The system asks the
physician to enter his private password for each prescription that is being sent
(the prototype system uses a batch process, so this password is entered for
each prescription ... the production system would have the password entered
for each unique prescription at the time it is entered, so this step would be
unnecessary). The system encrypts the prescription file with the public-key of
the pharmacy specified in each prescription record and adds the digital
signature of the physician (based on the private password) onto each
encrypted file. On a 486-based computer, this process takes less than 1
second using a 512-bit key_ If an invalid drug store is named, or an invalid
private password is entered, the system will display an error message. The
original unencrypted prescription can be viewed using a text editor (the
prescription will be named as c:\prescrip\9999999.dat, where 9999999 is the
unique 7 digit prescription number assigned by the computer). The encrypted
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prescription will be named as c:\prescrip\pharma\9999999.pgp, where
9999999 is the unique 7 digit prescription number). This file can be copied to
floppy disk or sent as an attachment to an e-mail message and sent over the
Internet.
3- The pharmacist selects the decrypt option from the pharmacy program screen.
The program asks the pharmacist for the pharmacy's private password. The
password is entered. If the password is invalid, the system displays an error
message and asks the pharmacist to re-enter the password. If the password is
valid, the system displays the digital signature of the physician (the
physician's name), decrypts the file by creating the
c:\prescrip\pharma\9999999.dat plain text file from the
c:\prescrip\pharma\9999999.pgp encrypted text file .. On a 486-based
computer, this process takes less than 1 second using a 512-bit key.
4- The pharmacist's program is run. The pharmacist enters the prescription
number and the unencrypted prescription data is displayed on the screen, The
pharmacist then enters the name of the drug that was actually dispensed.

Data entry was timed using this prototype system. A prescription can be entered
by a physician in 30 seconds or less. A prescription can be dispensed by a.pharmacist in
10 seconds or less. The actual time to encrypt and send a prescription, or decode and
receive a prescription, is less than one second (excluding the additional 5 seconds it takes
to enter the password in the prototype batch system). Based on this data, the physician
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and pharmacist would not spend an excessive amount of time issuing a prescriptions
while using this proposed system.
Cost Benefit Analysis
The process of computing the implementation and operational cost for the
proposed system is straight forward. There are fixed program and system development
costs. These costs include program development for the physician's and pharmacist's
systems, development of a training program, development of an installation program,
purchasing a server, and third-party licensing costs. These costs would be the same if the
system were deployed within a single state, a regional area, or nationwide. There are also
variable "per user" costs. These costs include deployment and connection fees and
would be variable depending upon the number of users that utilize the system. The peruser cost does not account for the cost of purchasing and maintaining a computer for the
physicians or pharmacists, but does include the cost of installing a new telephone line and
obtaining an account with an Internet Services Provider. Finally, there would be
recurring costs. These costs include maintenance, telecommunication, and administrative
costs. The following is a breakdown of the cost categories:
Fixed Development Costs
•

Physician's Program- The cost to develop the program code required for the
physician's program which serves as the data entry mechanism, transmits the
information to the Internet (or floppy diskette), interfaces with the public-key
cryptographic program, and displays the filled-prescription data. Based on the
dataflow diagrams and the required system functions, it is estimated that this
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program will take 400 hours to develop and test. Using a rate of $125 an
hour, the cost for this development effort will be $50,000.

•

Administration Program- The cost to develop the program code required for
the administration program which serves as the central-server for the system
and verifies that each prescription is unique, notifies the pharmacist that the
prescription is valid, is the repository of the public-keys, is the repository of
the valid user ID's, copies the prescribed and filled drug data to a third-party
database, and notifies the physician that the prescription has been filled ..
Based on the dataflow diagrams and the required system functions, it is
estimated that this program will take 1000 hours to develop and test. Using a
rate of$125 an hour, the cost for this development effort will be $125,000.

•

Pharmacist's Program- The cost to develop the program code required for the
pharmacist program which serves as the receiver of prescription information
(from the Internet or floppy diskette), interfaces with the program performing
the public-key encryption, verifies the validity of the prescriptions, displays
the prescription information, and receives data on the drug actually dispensed
by the pharmacist. Based on the dataflow diagrams and the required system
functions, it is estimated that this program will take 500 hours to develop and
test. Using a rate of $125 an hour, the cost for this development effort will be
$62,500.
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..

PGP. Licensing- A public domain program that can perform the actual publickey encryption and decryption is available from PGP Systems, Inc. and is
available free of charge.

..

Installation Setup Program- This program would allow new users to install the
software on their computers and allow existing users to obtain program
updates via the Internet. Based on the dataflow diagrams and the required
system functions, it is estimated that this program will take 200 hours to
develop and test. Using a rate of $125 an hour, the cost for this development
effort will be $25,000.

..

Development of Training Materials- This task would create an on-line,
interactive training system that would enable the users to learn how to use the
program and give them the option of printing a hardcopy of a user manual. It
is estimated that this program will take 200 hours to develop and test. Using a
rate of$125 an hour, the cost for this development effort will be $25,000.

..

Central System Costs- A large scale system server will be required in order to
perform the central administrative functions. The system would consist of a
mid-range computer such as a quad-processor HP-9000 with 2 terabytes of
disk storage and a hot-spare system setup at a backup site in the event of a
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system failure. The wide area network connectivity schema would consist of
a midrange Cisco (or similar) router and a small network to connect the
terminals of the people who will be maintaining the system and performing
the help-desk function. The cost of this system is estimated to be $1,500,000.

One-Time Per-User Costs
It

Deployment- This would include support for the installation, data-entry, and
setup of the user's computer and the overhead cost to support the new user ID
in the administration program. The estimated cost for these services is $10
per user.

It

Connection- This fee would cover the cost of connecting a physician's or
pharmacist's computer to the Internet and would include the Internet
connection fee (which varies between $0 and $10) and the cost of installing a
new phone line ($50). For the purpose of this analysis, the estimated cost for
these combined services is $60 per user.

Recurring Costs for Fixed Assets
It

Maintenance- Maintenance costs for hardware and software typically run at a
rate of 15% of the acquisition cost. In this case, the annual maintenance fee
would be estimated at $268,125.
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..

Administrative- Administrative overhead will consist of a cost allocation of
$500,000 per year to cover a core group of three individuals, rent, and
overhead costs.

Recurring Per-User Costs
..

Administrative- This fee covers one additional IT person in the administrative
office (performing system or helpdesk support) for every 500 users, system
overhead costs (disk space, bandwidth, etc.), and administrative overhead and
maintenance costs. The total fee is estimated at $400 per user, per year.

..

Telecommunication Costs- A fee of $70 per month ($840 per year) is
estimated for the cost of maintaining a dial-up business line for use by the
system.

..

Internet Service Fees- A fee of $20 per month ($240 per year) is estimated for
the cost of maintaining an Internet account.

Cost Summary:
Fixed Costs- $1,787,500
Recurring Costs-

$768,125

Per User Recurring Cost- $1,550
Annual Recurring Cost with 10,000 users (pharmacists and physicians) participating:
$16,268,125

ble 1 - Net Benefit and ROI Analysis of the Proposed System
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The analysis based on revenue from only the sale of data with 10,000 users shows
a potential net positive cash flow in the first year of $281,174,700. The ROI of the
system is estimated at 15,810.05% over a useful life of five years. During the second,
and subsequent years, the positive cash flow is estimated at $282,962,200. When the
number of users is increased to 100,000, the net positive cash flow during the first year is
estimated at $ 141,674,700. During the second, and subsequent years, the positive cash
flow is estimated at $143,462,200. The ROI of the system estimated at 8,005.86% over a
useful life of five years. This scenario would be best applied to a corporate funded
project, since the revenue is based solely upon the commercial sale of the data and does
not account for any benefit to society.
The analysis based on the positive economic impact of only eliminating
prescription drug fraud with 10,000 users shows a potential net positive cash flow in the
first year of$I,981,174,700. The ROI of the system is estimated at 110,914.95% over a
useful life of five years. During the second, and subsequent years, the positive cash flow
is estimated at $1,982,962,200. When the number of users is increased to 100,000, the net
positive cash flow during the first year is estimated at $ 1,841,674,000. During the
second, and subsequent years, the positive cash flow is estimated at $1,843,462,200. The
ROIof the system estimated at 103,110.75% over a useful life of five years. This
scenario would be best applied to a government funded project, since the revenue is based
solely upon positive overall economic impacts, rather than actual revenue being
recognized from the sale of the data.
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Chapter V
Implications, Recommendations, Conclusions, and Summary

Implications and Recommendations

There are five significant issues that would need to be addressed in the event that
this system was implemented. The first issue is privacy. There may be a perception by
the patient that their personal medical information may be available to unauthorized
individuals, even though the data is secure as it moves through the Internet (or is
transported by the patient on floppy diskette). Also, the government, by court order, will
be able to view prescription data, review the number and types of prescriptions being
issued by physicians, or view the number oflegal prescriptions that a patient receives in
order to determine if they are abusing drugs, or if their activities are being monitored for
reasons of national security or other purposes.
The privacy issue is difficult to address. The government may see this system as
a tool to combat drug abuse, monitor physicians performing illegal or unethical activities,
perform other drug tracking or monitoring functions, or even develop algorithms to use
patient activity for a particular doctor as the basis for determining expected revenues and
triggering tax audits. If the system were going to be used on a national level, these issues
would need to be discussed at great length. The results may be based upon current
political philosophy, rather than trying to achieve the highest possible ethical and medical
standards. There would also need to be a public awareness campaign that details the
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reason for the system and provides assurances that the patient's data is confidential and
not viewable by anyone other than the physician and pharmacist. Positive aspects, such
as the fact that the system can actually enhance service by having the prescription filled
when it is transmitted to the pharmacy and waiting for the patient upon their arrival,
should also be emphasized.
The second significant issue is related to government mandates and acceptance by
the physicians and pharmacists. This system will only be successful if it is deployed on a
Statewide level, or larger scale, with 100% participation from the physicians and
pharmacists. If only 50% of the pharmacies participate, then the patients may not be able
to have their prescription dispensed at the pharmacy of their choice .. Even though this
model proposes making the software available to all users free of charge, the survey
results show that approximately half of the potential physicians and pharmacists will not
use the system, even under the most favorable terms and conditions possible. A
government mandate is likely to be met with resistance from the American Medical
Association and other corporate, fraternal, and public-interest organizations.
The third significant issue is nationwide deployment and use. As previously
mentioned, a large scale deployment of this system is required in order for it to be
effective. Other large scale projects have failed due to the complexities of the
deployment. This system, including the helpdesk, training, and administration functions
to support 100,000 users will be a massive undertaking. In order to effectively deal with
this situation, the system can be deployed using a phased approach. Since physicians
cannot write prescriptions in one state and have them filled in another, the system can be
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deployed on a state-by-state basis. There can also be a period oftime, perhaps a year or
so, when both the manual and automated systems can be used simultaneously. A phased
implementation will not materially impact the cost; however, the value ofthe data that
would be put for sale to fund the system, or the value to society in terms of a positive
economic impact from eliminating prescription drug fraud, will be significantly less
during this transition period.
The fourth significant issue is exclusivity. If the system will be funded by the
private sector, one firm (or a consortium of firms) will need to have exclusive control
over the sale of the transactional data, since this data would be the funding mechanism of
the project. A public-private partnership would be the best method to implement the
system. The government would mandate the system use and the private sector entity
would provide the funding and have exclusive rights to sell the data. Contracts can be
awarded by the government to the private sector entity that is the lowest bidder and who
presents the most favorable terms and services for the patients, physicians, pharmacists,
and government.
The final significant issue is system reliability. The system must maintain a high
level of production reliability. Any failures with the local telephone company systems,
long distance telephone company systems, system resources, etc. will adversely impact a
subset of the users. Fortunately, the Internet can provide rerouting to an alternate
computer center location in the event of a telecommunications or systems failure
impacting the central administration program offices.
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Conclusions and Summary

Because of the lack of adequate controls, there is a serious problem with forged
and altered prescriptions being issued within the United States. A 1994 study by the
White House Office of National Drug Control estimated that there was two billion dollars
spent annually on illegal prescription drugs that would have otherwise been spent to
support legitimate activities in the overall domestic economy. Hospital records show that
from 1990 through 1995, there has been a steady and alarming increase in overdoses of
prescription medication. The United States Drug Enforcement Administration has
estimated that in 1993 approximately twenty-five billion dollars in prescription drugs
were sold illegally, compared to a government estimate of thirty-one billion dollars spent
that year on cocaine. A large percentage of these drugs originate from altered
prescriptions.
The mechanics of prescription fraud can take many forms. These include forgery
of the physician's signature, alteration of the dosage or quantity of medication found on a
legitimate prescription, phone-in prescription fraud, and theft of prescription blanks.
Recent developments in the computer field have resulted in computer assisted
cryptographic methods that can authenticate users, signatures, and the contents of
electronic messages. One such method is a public key cryptographic system (PKCS).
This technology allows data to be encrypted over public networks and allows the
recipient of the message to definitively authenticate and verify both the contents and the
sender of the message.
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This investigation showed that a theoretical public-key cryptographic schema can
be used to authenticate every prescription written by a licensed physician and prevent any
alteration to its written contents. The schema utilizes a physician interface program, a
pharmacist interface program, a central administration program, and the PGP public-key
cryptographic program in order to perform the encryption, as well as to transmit and
validate the data. The programs would be menu-driven, easy to use, and available free of
charge to the physicians and pharmacists.
Prescription drug data can be sent from the physician to the pharmacist using the
Internet as the transmission medium. The data would be routed through the Internet in an
encrypted form and cannot be read by anyone other than the intended recipient. A floppy
diskette can also be used in the event that Internet service is not available.
Data on the actual drug dispensed will be captured by the pharmacist's program
and transmitted back to the physician. The administration program can also have the
capability of capturing this data since it has commercial value. The current worldwide
market for this data is $1,500,000,000.
A prototype system was developed. The system functioned on a variety of
hardware platforms, including all currently manufactured PC's. The prototype system
illustrated that the PKCS system would be easy to use and that the entry of the
prescription data would take under 30 seconds, encryption and transmission, as well as
decryption and receipt of data, would take less than 1 second. The system process that
the pharmacist would use to dispense medication would take less than 5 seconds.
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Installation and training can be handled through interactive programs that can be
available on the World Wide Web. The results showed that a public-key cryptographic
system will eliminate prescription fraud by providing positive authentication of every
prescription received by the pharmacist, and that the contents of the prescription could
not be altered between the time it was written by the physician and received by the
pharmacist. The investigation showed that the system is not expensive to develop or use.
A survey was developed and the responses from one hundred physicians and one
hundred pharmacists were received and analyzed. The results showed that the majority of
the respondents will be reluctant to embrace the technology; however, younger and more
computer-literate users, as well as those users who perceive that a significant problem
with prescription drug fraud already exists, were more likely to accept and use the
technology.
The economic issues were analyzed by computing the actual cost of implementing
the system using existing products and comparing these costs against the estimated costs
available from the federal government associated with prescription drug fraud. The
results show that, over the course of five years, the nationwide deployment of the system
would have a minimum positive cash flow of$715,523,500 and a minimum ROI of over
8,000 percent.
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Appendix A
Physician's Survey
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206 Farmsedge Road
Neshanic Station, New Jersey 08853
September 1, 1998
Dear Doctor:
I am a student enrolled in the doctoral program at the School of Computer and
Information Sciences at Nova Southeastern University. I am completing research for my
dissertation and. would be grateful if you can spend a few minutes completing this brief
survey. Your responses will be held in complete confidence and no information that can
identify you will be requested or maintained.
My dissertation deals with the problem of prescription fraud. As you may know,
prescription fraud takes many forms including the alteration of the scrip by an
unauthorized individual, the theft of prescription blanks, and the forgery of physician's
signatures. The dissertation proposes a theoretical model that uses a technique known as
public-key cryptography. Using this technique, prescriptions can be sent electronically
between the physician and the pharmacist over the Internet. The contents of the
prescription are coded in such a manner that only the recipient (e.g. the pharmacy that the
patient specifies) can decode the contents of the prescription. The prescription would
also include an electronic signature from the physician so the pharmacist can authenticate
both the sender of the message and its contents.
I have enclosed a self-addressed, stamped envelope to facilitate the return of the survey.
In order to meet my academic deadlines, I would appreciate receiving your response by
October 1st. Please accept my thanks in advance for your time and efforts.

Sincerely Yours,

Donald R. Lemma
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PHYSICIAN'S SURVEY REGARDING THE USE OF PUBLIC-KEY
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS TO ISSUE PRESCRIPTIONS

DEMOGRAPHICS:
AGE:
GENDER:
YEARS IN PRACTICE:
MEDICAL PRACTICE SPECIALTY:
IN WHICH STATE DO YOU MAINTAIN YOUR PRINCIPAL OFFICE?
DO YOU REGULARLY TREAT MEDICAID OR INDIGENT PATIENTS?

YOUR PERCEPTION OF PRESCRIPTION FRAUD:

DefiningprescriptionJraud, for the purpose of this survey, as patients or other
individuals altering prescriptions, using stolen prescription blanks, forging your
signature on a prescription, or giving voice-authorization to a phannacist by falsely
representing themselves as you, please respond to each of the following questions with a
numeric value ranging from "1" (no problem exists) to "5" (a significant problem exists).
_ _ _ To what extent do you believe that a problem exists with prescription fraud in
the United States?
_ _ _ To what extent do you believe that a problem exists with prescription fraud in
your State?
_ _ _ To what extent do you believe that a problem exists with prescription fraud in
your practice?
_ _ _ To your knowledge, has any individual altered one of your prescriptions, stolen
or forged a prescription blank with your name on it, forged your signature on a
prescription blank, or given voice-authorization to a phannacist (representing themselves
as you) in order to issue a fraudulent prescription?
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ What type of prescription fonns do you use
(standard fonns or safety fonns)?
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CURRENT PRACTICES:
_ _ _ Approximately how many prescriptions (including refills) do you issue each
month?

Please break down this amount by the method of prescription issuance:

_ _ _% Written on prescription a pad.
_ _ _% Telephoned into phannacist.
_ _ _% Telephoned to you by the phannacist.

_ _ _% Other (Specify

).

100% TOTAL

AUTOMATION/COMPUTERIZATION STATUS:
_ _ _ Do you currently have a computer system in your office?
_ _ _ Is this office system connected to the Internet?
_ _ _ Do you currently have a computer system at your home?
_ _ _ Is this home system connected to the Internet?
_ _ _ How would you rate your familiarity with personal computers (low, medium, high)?
_ _ _ How would you rate your familiarity with the Internet (low, medium, high)?
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ACCEPTANCE OF A PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEM:

Suppose there was a system that utilized a PC, software, and an Internet connection that
completely eliminated fraudulent prescriptions, please indicate by selecting a numeric
response from 1 to 5 ("1" indicates not likely at all, "5" indicates very likely) as to how
likely you would be to use this system if:
_ _ _ The hardware, software, and Internet connection was provided and paid for by
the government or some other third party?
You had to obtain the hardware, software, and Internet connection yourself and the total
cost was:

_ _ _ $2000
_ _ _ $1000
$500
_ _ _ $250
_ _ _ $0

_ _ _ Assuming that you already have a PC, how much would you be willing to pay
for the software that would perform this function?
_ _ _ How much would you be willing to pay (annually) for the Internet connection
fees, assuming you can use the Internet connection for other business or personal use?
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SYSTEM FUNCTIONS:
Please rate how important would each of these factors be in deciding whether to use this
theoretical system by assigning a value of 1 to 5 ("1" indicates that it is not important,
"5" indicates that it is critical):
1-

The ability to eliminate altered prescriptions.

2-

The ability to eliminate people forging prescriptions in my name.

3-

The ability to prevent people from authorizing prescriptions in my name over
the telephone.

4-

The ability to verify that a patient had their prescription filled.

5-

The ability to audit every prescription that was filled in my name.

6-

The ability to insure that the prescription is not seen by any individual other
than the pharmacist.

7-

The ability to obtain and operate this system at little or no cost.

8-

The ability to use a computer as an alternate method of writing prescriptions.

Now, please rank these eight factors in order of importance (" 1" being the most important
factor, "8" being the least important factor)
1-

The ability to eliminate altered prescriptions.

2-

The ability to eliminate people forging prescriptions in my name.

3-

The ability to prevent people from authorizing prescriptions in my name over
the telephone.

4-

The ability to verify that a patient had their prescription filled.

5-

The ability to audit every prescription that was filled in my name.

6-

The ability to insure that the prescription is not seen by any individual other
than the pharmacist.

7-

The ability to obtain and operate this system at little or no cost.

8-

The ability to use a computer as an alternate method of writing prescriptions.
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COMMENTS

Please make any comments or suggestions below:

Thank you for participating in this survey. Kindly return the survey anonymously
in the enclosed self addressed, stamped envelope by October 1st. Your responses
will be held in complete confidence and no information that can identify you will be
requested or maintained.

Donald R. Lemma
206 Farmsedge Road
Neshanic Station, N.J. 08853
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AppendixB
Pharmacist's Survey
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206 Farmsedge Road
Neshanic Station, New Jersey 08853
September 1, 1998
Dear Pharmacist:
I am a student enrolled in the doctoral program at the School of Computer and
Information Sciences at Nova Southeastern University. I am completing research for my
dissertation and would be grateful if you can spend a few minutes completing this brief
survey. Your responses will be held in complete confidence and no information that can
identify you will be requested or maintained.
My dissertation deals with the problem of prescription fraud. As you may know,
prescription fraud takes many forms including the alteration of the scrip by an
unauthorized individual, the theft of prescription blanks, and the forgery of physician's
signatures. The dissertation proposes a theoretical model that uses a technique known as
public-key cryptography. Using this technique, prescriptions can be sent electronically
between the physician and the pharmacist over the Internet. The contents of the
prescription are coded in such a manner that only the recipient (e.g. the pharmacy that the
patient specifies) can decode the contents of the prescription. The prescription would
also include an electronic signature from the physician so the pharmacist can authenticate
both the sender of the message and its contents.
I have enclosed a self-addressed, stamped envelope to facilitate the return of the survey.
In order to meet my academic deadlines, I would appreciate receiving your response by
October 1st. Please accept my thanks in advance for your time and efforts.

Sincerely Yours,

Donald R. Lemma
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PHARMACIST'S SURVEY REGARDING THE USE OF PUBLIC-KEY
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS TO ISSUE PRESCRIPTIONS

DEMOGRAPHICS:
AGE:
GENDER:
YEARS IN PRACTICE:
PHARMACY TYPE (HOSPITAL, CHAIN, PRIVATELY OWNED: _ _ _ __
IN WHICH STATE DO YOU MAINTAIN YOUR PRINCIPAL OFFICE?
DO YOU REGULARLY FILL PRESCRIPTIONS FOR MEDICAID PATIENTS?

YOUR PERCEPTION OF PRESCRIPTION FRAUD:

Definingprescriptionjraud, for the purpose of this survey, as patients or other
individuals altering prescriptions, using stolen prescription blanks, forging a physician's
signature on a prescription, or giving voice-authorization to a phannacist by falsely
representing themselves as a physician or other authorized party, please respond to each
of the following questions with a numeric value ranging from "I" (no problem exists) to
"5" (a significant problem exists).
_ _ _ To what extent do you believe that a problem exists with prescription fraud in
the United States?
_ _ _ To what extent do you believe that a problem exists with prescription fraud in
your state?
_ _ _ To what extent do you believe that a problem exists with prescription fraud in
your pharmacy?
_ _ _ To the best you're your knowledge, has any individual altered the contents of a
prescription fonn given to you to fill, given you a stolen or forged prescription fonn,
given you a prescription fonn that contained a forged physician's signature, or given you
voice-authorization to fill a prescription by the caller falsely representing themselves to
you as a licensed physician?
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CURRENT PRACTICES:
_ _ _ Approximately how many prescriptions (including refills) do you fill each
month?

Please break down this amount by the method that you receive the prescription:
_ _ _% Written on prescription a pad.
_ _ _ % Telephoned to you by the physician.
_ _ _% Telephoned to the physician by you at the patient's request.

_ _ _% Other (Specify_ _ _ _ _~).
100% TOTAL

AUTOMATION/COMPUTERIZATION STATUS
_ _ _ Do you currently have a computer system in your phannacy?
_ _ _ Is this pharmacy's system connected to the Internet?
_ _ _ Do you currently have a computer system at your home?
_ _ _ Is this home system connected to the Internet?
_ _ _ How would you rate your familiarity with personal computers (low, medium, high)?
_ _ _ How would you rate your familiarity with the Internet (low, medium, high)?
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ACCEPTANCE OF A PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEM:

Suppose there was a system that utilized a PC, software, and an Internet connection that
completely eliminated fraudulent prescriptions, please indicate by selecting a numeric
response from 1 to 5 ("1" indicates not likely at all, "5" indicates very likely) as to how
likely you would be to use this system if:
_ _ _ The hardware, software, and Internet connection was provided and paid for by
the government or some other third party?
You had to obtain the hardware, software, and Internet connection yourself and the total
cost was:

_ _ _ $2000
_ _ _ $1000
_ _ _ $500
_ _ _ $250
_ _ _ $0

_ _ _ Assuming that you already have a PC, how much would you be willing to pay
for the software that would perform this function?
_ _ _ How much would you be willing to pay (annually) for the Internet connection
fees, assuming you can use the Internet connection for other business or personal use?
_ _ _ Do you think this type of system would increase your volume of business,
decrease business, or have no effect on business?
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SYSTEM FUNCTIONS:
Please rate how important would each of these factors be in deciding whether to use this
theoretical system by assigning a value of 1 to 5 ("1" indicates that it is not important,
"5" indicates that it is critical):
1.
2.

The ability to eliminate altered prescriptions.
The ability to improve efficiency by reducing the mount of time spent on
the phone with a physician.

3.

The ability for a physician to verify that a patient had their prescription
filled.

4.

The ability to insure that the prescription is not seen by any individual other
than the pharmacist and physician.

5.
6.

The ability to obtain and operate this system at little or no cost.
The ability to use a computer as an alternate method of receiving
prescriptions.

Now, please rank these six factors in order of importance ("I" being the most important
factor, "6" being the least important factor)

1.
2.

The ability to eliminate altered prescriptions.
The ability to improve efficiency by reducing the mount of time spent on
the phone with a physician.

3.

The ability for a physician to verify that a patient had their prescription
filled.

4.

5.
6.

The ability to insure that the prescription is not seen by any individual other
than the pharmacist and physician.
The ability to obtain and operate this system at little or no cost.
The ability to use a computer as an alternate method of receiving
prescriptions.
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COMMENTS

Please make any comments or suggestions below:

Thank you for participating in this survey. Kindly return the survey anonymously
in the enclosed self addressed, stamped envelope by October 1st. Your responses
will be held in complete confidence and no information that can identify you will be
requested or maintained.

Donald R. Lemma
206 Fannsedge Road
Neshanic Station, N.J. 08853
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Appendix C
Nova Southeastern University Human Subjects Request and Approval Letter

98

206 Fannsedge Road
Neshanic Station, N.J. 08853
July 30, 1998
Dr. Maxine Cohen
Nova Southeastern University
3100 S.W. 9th Avenue
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33315-3025
Dear Dr. Cohen:
I am a doctoral student at Nova Southeastern University. I am in the process of
completing the preliminary proposal for my dissertation. I am writing to you in your
capacity as the SCIS representative to the NSU Institutional Review Board. As part of
my dissertation I plan to conduct a survey. It is my understanding that, in accordance
with NSU policy, a review is required.
The dissertation is entitled "A theoretical model for a prescription drug public-key
cryptographic system". Basically, this project will establish a computer uses digital
signatures to authenticate prescriptions that doctors write for their patients. By using
public-key cryptographic techniques, the possibility of prescription fraud (alteration of
the prescription blank including quantities and strengths of medications, theft of
prescription blanks, forgery of the physician's signature, etc.), authentication, and nonrepudiation would be eliminated.
One of the problems with this approach would be acceptance by the physicians and
pharmacists of an electronic system. The survey would ask for their perception of the
current problem and their likelihood of using the proposed system. There would be no
place on the survey to identify the physician, phannacist, patient, or any other person.
Surveys would be sent to the physician or phannacist by mail and returned by mail. Any
identifying information (envelope with return address, business card, etc.) will be
discarded.
I hope that this letter adequately addresses the review criteria. I am certain that this
endeavor will fall into the exempt category. I would like to mail the survey on or about
September 1st; however, I shall await your written approval or instructions before
proceeding further.
Sincerely Yours,

Donald R. Lemma
Lemmad@scis.nova.edu
Cc:

Sumitra Mukherjee
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Subj:
Date:
From:
To:
CC:

IRB approvals
98-08-2719:24:16 EDT
cohenm@scis.acast.nova.edu (Maxine Cohen)
lemmad@scis.acast.nova.edu (Donald R. Lemma)
sumitra@scis.acast.nova.edu (Sumitra Mukherjee), cohenm@scis.acast.nova.edu (Maxine Cohen)

Donald,
This note is to officially record and log your research proposal itA Theoretical Model for a prescription
drug public-key cryptographic system" as Exempt under the rules of the NSU Institutional Review Board
(IRB).
Exempt does not mean the research is exempt from review. It means the research does not need to go
before the IRB board for a full review. The research is still logged and recorded as human subjects research
under
SCIS.
All of your paper work was filled out satisfactorily. I am copying Dr. Mukherjee on this note as your
dissertation advisor.
There are a few things I noted when I read through your materials. These changes do not impact your IRB
approval process.
On the cover letter, I would give them a date to return the survey. on the actual survey itself
Your perception of prescription fraud
After the rating questions one to 5, I would put some more space and now say yes or no or choices
specified.
Current practices
to you issue each month, should be do you issue each month.
Acceptance of a public key cryptographic system
for the last 2 questions, do you want to set up ranges?
last page
Do you want to give them an option if they are interested in the results,
how to get them?
Again, I would put a return date at the end.
Best of luck with your research.
Maxine S. Cohen
Associate Professor School of Computer and Information Sciences
Nova Southeastern University
phone: 954 262 2072
fax: 9542623915
cohenm@scis.acast.nova.edu

1O0
----------------------- Headers -------------------------------Return-Path: <cohenm@scis.acast.nova.edu>
Received: from relay18.mx.aol.com (relay18.mail.aol.com [172.31.109.18]) by airlO.mail.aol.com (v49.4)
with SMTP; Thu, 27 Aug 1998 19:24:16 -0400
Received: from scis.acast.nova.edu (scis.acast.nova.edu [l37.52.224.15])
by relay18.mx.aol.com (8.8.8/8.8.5/AOL-4.0.0)
with ESMTP id TAA21126 for <lemmad@aol.com>; Thu, 27 Aug 1998 19:24:13 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from localhost by scis.acast.nova.edu (8.9.118.9.1) with SMTP id TAA26941;
Thu, 27 Aug 1998 19:24:09 -0400 (EDT)
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 1998 19:24:09 -0400 (EDT)
From: Maxine Cohen <cohenm@scis.acast.nova.edu>
To: "Donald R. Lemma" <lemmad@scis.acast.nova.edu>
cc: Sumitra Mukherjee <sumitra@scis.acast.nova.edu>,
Maxine Cohen <cohenm@scis.acast.nova.edu>
Subject: IRE approvals
Message-ID: <Pine.GS0.3.96.980827191715.26219B-1 OOOOO@scis.acast.nova.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXTIPLAIN; charset=US-ASCII

Subj:
Date:
From:
To:
CC:

oops
98-08-27 19:26:26 EDT
cohenm@scis.acast.nova.edu (Maxine Cohen)
lemmad@scis.acast.nova.edu (Donald R. Lemma)
sumitra@scis.acast.nova.edu (Sumitra Mukherjee), cohenm@scis.acast.nova.edu (Maxine Cohen)

Donald,
After I wrote your note, I realized there was a pharmacist's survey as well. It is basically the same and
therefore, it is approved as well. My comments on the other survey apply here as well.
Maxine S. Cohen
Associate Professor School of Computer and Information Sciences
Nova Southeastern University
phone: 954 262 2072
fax: 9542623915
cohenm@scis.acast.nova.edu
----------------------- Headers -------------------------------Return-Path: <cohenm@scis.acast.nova.edu>
Received: from rly-za03.mx.aol.com (rly-za03.mail.aol.com [172.31.36.99]) by air-za04.mail.aol.com
(v49.4) with SMTP; Thu, 27 Aug 1998 19:26:23 -0400
Received: from scis.acast.nova.edu (scis.acast.nova.edu [137.52.224.15])
by rly-za03.mx.aol.com (8.8.8/8.8.5/AOL-4.0.0)
with ESMTP id TAA28647 for <lemmad@aol.com>; Thu, 27 Aug 1998 19:26:12 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from localhost by scis.acast.nova.edu (8.9.1/8.9.1) with SMTP id TAA27107;
Thu, 27 Aug 1998 19:26:08 -0400 (EDT)
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 1998 19:26:08 -0400 (EDT)
From: Maxine Cohen <cohenm@scis.acast.nova.edu>
To: "Donald R. Lemma" <lemmad@scis.acast.nova.edu>
cc: Sumitra Mukherjee <sumitra@scis.acast.nova.edu>,
Maxine Cohen <cohenm@scis.acast.nova.edu>
Subject: oops
Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.3 .96.980827192456.26219C-l OOOOO@scis.acast.nova.edu>
MIME-Version: l.0
Content-Type: TEXTIPLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
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AppendixD
Prototype Program Installation and Operation Instructions

Installation Instructions:
In order to install the prototype system, you will require a computer with:
1- An MS-DOS or Windows operating system.
2- A hard disk with at least 2Mb of storage space available on hard disk drive "C:".
3- A 386 or faster CPU.
Please perform the following steps:
1- If you are in Windows, select the START icon on the lower left part of your screen,
then select RUN. Type: a:install. If you have a DOS computer, skip to step 2.
2- At the DOS prompt, insert DISKETTE 1 into the "A" drive of your computer and
type: A:INSTALL
3- The computer will create three sub-directories. These include:
•

C:\DA5 - This subdirectory contains the Direct Access menu system.

•

C:\PRESCRIP - This subdirectory contains the physician and PGP programs.

•

C:\PRESCRIP\PHARMA - This subdirectory contains the pharmacist program.

If you run the installation program more than one time, you will receive an warning
message telling you that these directories already exist. Please ignore the warning
message and proceed with the installation.
4- The computer will copy the programs. A list of the files being copied will appear on
the screen.
5- The computer will then automatically start the program.
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Operation Instructions:

STARTING AND EXITING THE PROGRAM
To start the program, follow these steps:
DOS USERS:
1- Exit to DOS
2- Make sure your default drive is drive "C:". If you are unsure, type: C:
3- Change directories to the Direct Access Menu System by typing: CD\DA5
4- Type: MAIN to start the program.
WINDOWS USERS:
1. Select the START icon on the lower left part of your screen, then select RUN. Type:
c:\da5\main
To exit the program, follow these steps:
1- Select the FlO option from the main menu (you will be returned to DOS or
WINDOWS)

SELECTING MENU OPTIONS
Once you start the program, the main menu will appear with three options. Option A
calls up the physician's system, Option B calls up the pharmacist's system, and Option C
calls up the PGP maintenance system. Select the desired option by scrolling up and down
the menu using the up and down arrow keys. When the desired option is highlighted,
press the ENTER key. Instead of scrolling, you have the option of simply typing the
letter of the desired option (A, B, or C).
The physician's system has two program options. The first option is running the
physician's program. This program is used to create, edit, and delete prescriptions. The
second option is used to encrypt the prescription data, add a digital signature, and
"transmit" the data to the pharmacist's system.

SELECTING THE PHYSICIAN'S PROGRAMS
Select option A from the main menu. Select option A on the physician's system menu.
This will bring you into the physician's program (please note that the program will
activate the CAPS LOCK key on your keyboard ... you should leave the CAPS function
activated so that all data entry is made using upper-case letters). Select option B after
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you have entered the prescriptions and wish to encrypt and send the prescriptions to the
pharmacist's program.

PHYSICIAN'S PROGRAM- ENTERING PRESCRIPTIONS
Select option 1 on the physician's program to enter a new prescription (you can press
ESC, followed by RETURN at any time to return to this screen). The system will bring
up the prescription data entry screen. There are sixteen data elements on this screen. The
screen displays the name of the field, followed by a default value, or a series of "dots".
Each dot represents a character that can be entered for each field. If there are (e.g.)
fifteen dots following the "LAST NAME" field, you may enter up to 15 characters. Type
the characters for each field, followed by the ENTER key. Pressing ENTER stores the
value that you typed in the field. Many of the fields require that you enter a value. The
following is a list of the data elements within the physician's system, their field lengths,
field required values and field default values:
1Prescription Number- A unique seven digit number assigned by the
computer. This number is not alterable by the user and the same number is used
for the unencrypted prescription on the physician'S computer and pharmacist's
computer.
2Last Name- The last name of the person for whom the prescription is
being written. Data entry is required in this field.
3First Name- The first name of the person for whom the prescription is
being written. Data entry is required in this field.
4Quantity- The quantity of the drug being prescribed. Data entry is
required in this field.
5Drug Name- The name ofthe drug being prescribed. Data entry is
required in this field.
6StrengthIDosage- The strength and dosage of the drug being prescribed.
Data entry is required in this field.
7field.

Refills- The number of refills permitted. Data entry is required in this

8Instructions- The instructions for taking the prescribed medication. The
default value is "TAKE AS DIRECTED".
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9Date- The date that the prescription was written by the physician in the
format MMlDD/YYYY. The default value is the current date.
10Physician's Name- The name of the physician issuing the prescription.
The default value is JOHN SMITH. Another physician contained in the prototype
system is ALLEN JONES. You may add additional physicians by creating keypairs for them. The name must be entered exactly as it appears on the public key
ring (PLEASE USE UPPER CASE LETTERS). This process is explained in the
"CREATE PGP KEY PAIRS" section, contained later in this report.
11Physician's DEA Number- The DEA number of the physician issuing the
prescription. The default value is 22-12345.

12Physician's Private Key- The PGP private-key of the physician issuing the
prescription. A value must be entered, but since the prototype system, uses a
batch methodology for encryption and transfer, the value in this field is ignored
by the prototype system.
13Pharmacy Name- The name of the pharmacy that will be dispensing the
medication. The default value is DRUG FAIR. Another pharmacy contained in
the prototype system is RITE AID. You may add additional pharmacies by
creating key-pairs for them. The name must be entered exactly as it appears on
the public key ring (PLEASE USE UPPER CASE LETTERS). This process is
explained in the "CREATE PGP KEY PAIRS" section, contained later in this
report.
14Pharmacy DEA Number- The DEA number of the pharmacy dispensing
the medication. This field is not utilized by the prototype system and may be left
blank.
15Pharmacy Public Key- This value is not required by the prototype system
and would only be required in the production system if the Internet connection to
the key-server was down.
16Drug Dispensed- This field would be used by the physician to view the
drug that was actually dispensed by the pharmacy. The physician would not be
able to enter a value in this field.

You may go to the previous field on the screen without erasing the contents of the fields,
by pressing the UP-ARROW key. You can scroll to the next field on the screen without
erasing the contents of the field by pressing the DOWN-ARROW key. If you begin to
over-write a field and wish to restore the field contents to their original value, press the
PAGE-UP key (you must do this before pressing the ENTER key). You can exit the
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screen WITHOUT saving the contents by pressing the FlOor ESC key. You can save the
prescription by pressing the END key. The default values for these keys are displayed at
the bottom of the screen.

PHYSICIAN'S PROGRAM- MODIFYING PRESCRIPTIONS
You may modifY an existing prescription at any time by selecting option #2 at the main
menu. The system will ask you for the prescription number. Enter the number and press
RETURN. If you have forgotten the prescription number, follow the procedures in the
"PHYSICIAN'S PROGRAM- LOOKING UP PRESCRIPTION NUMBERS AND
NAMES" section.
If you enter an invalid number, the system will "beep" and return you to the main
physician's menu. If you enter a valid number, the system will display the prescription
on the screen. You may modifY any value on the screen using the same keys and values
described in the previous section of this report. Remember to use the UP-ARROW and
DOWN-ARROW keys to scroll through the fields. Press FlO to abandon any changes
that you made to the prescription data and return to the main menu (the prescription
record remains unchanged), or press the END key to save your changes.

PHYSICIAN'S PROGRAM- DELETING PRESCRIPTIONS
You may delete an existing prescription at any time by selecting option #3 at the main
menu. The system will ask you for the prescription number. Enter the number and press
RETURN. If you have forgotten the prescription number, follow the procedures in the
"PHYSICIAN'S PROGRAM- LOOKING UP PRESCRIPTION NUMBERS AND
NAMES" section.
If you enter an invalid number, the system will "beep" and return you to the main
physician's menu. If you enter a valid number, the system will display a warning
message that you are about to delete the prescription. If you confirm the deletion, the
prescription will be permanently deleted. You can press ESC, followed by the RETURN
key to delete the prescription.

PHYSICIAN'S PROGRAM- LOOKING UP PRESCRIPTION NUMBERS AND
NAMES
You can lookup the prescription numbers of all prescriptions entered for a patient, based
on the patient's name, and you can lookup a patient's name based on the prescription
number, by selecting option #4 at the main menu.
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The system will ask if you wish to lookup the data based on (n)ame or (p)rescription
number. Enter a "n" or a "p". The system will then ask you to enter the prescription
number or the first part of the patient's last name. Type in the patient's last name (or the'
first few letters of the last name). The system will then display a list of all prescriptions
meeting the search criteria. The information includes the prescription number, patient
name, date that the prescription was issued, the name of the drug, and a status as to
whether the prescription has been filled or not (for the prototype system, the status screen
is only active for the pharmacist's program). Press ESC followed by ENTER to return to
the main menu.

PHYSICIAN'S PROGRAM- EXITING THE PROGRAM
You can exit the physician's program by selecting option number 5 at the main menu.

ENCRYPTION AND DIGITAL SIGNATURE PROGRAM
Select option A from the main menu. Select option B on the physician's system menu.
This will bring you into the PGP encryption and digital signature program. This program
will encrypt the prescription data with the pharmacy's public-key, add a digital signature
using the physician's private-key, and transmit the encrypted files to the pharmacy
program.
Once you select this option, the computer may display a "TZ" warning message
informing you that the "config.sys" program needs to be updated with a parameter that
sets the machines local time as a set number of hours differing from Greenwich Mean
Time (GMT). Rather than alter the configuration of the user's PC, this parameter is left
unset. It does not affect the operation of the prototype system in any way.
The computer will display each prescription file name (e.g. 990000 l.dat) and ask for the
PGP password of the physician who created the prescription (based on the name of the
physician that was typed into the prescription file when the prescription was created).
Enter the password of: SMITH12 for Dr. John Smith or JONES34 for Dr. Allen Jones
(these are the two physicians that have private keys established in the prototype system).
Please note that these passwords need to be entered with UPPER CASE TEXT. You may
also enter the password of any new physician that you added to the system using the
"CREATE PGP KEY PAIRS" options, discussed later in this section of the report.
Please note, the computer will also display the name of the pharmacy. If the pharmacy
name is invalid (e.g. misspelled or if it does not have a PGP key-pair created for it, the
computer will display an error message saying that it cannot find the pharmacy name and
ask you for the name of an alternate key-ring. Please press the CTRL and the BREAK
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keys to force the computer to go to the next prescription. You can then go back into the
physician's program, fix the name ofthe pharmacy, and rerun this encryption process.
When the encryption process takes place, the prescription file name will remain the same,
but the file extension will change from .dat to .pgp and the data will be "transmitted" to
the pharmacist's system (e.g. transferred from c:\prescrip to c:\prescrip\pharma). If an
invalid password is entered, the computer will display a warning message and ask you to
re-enter the physician's private-key password. After three invalid attempts of entering the
private-key password, the computer will not send the prescription and.move to the next
prescription in the batch file.
Please note, if you run the process more than once, the computer will recognize the
existence of any .pgp prescription files within the pharmacist's system. The computer
will display a warning message stating that the file already exists and will ask if you want
to overwrite it. Please type in a "y" (for yes). The process may be run any number of
times and the information will simply be overlaid in the file system.
When the last prescription has been encrypted, the computer will return to the main
menu.

DECRYPTION AND AUTHENTICATION PROGRAM
Select option B from the main menu. Select option A on the pharmacist's system menu.
This will bring you into the PGP decryption and authentication program. This program
will decrypt the prescription data with the pharmacy's private-key, verify the digital
signature using the physician's public-key, and convert the prescription PGP files to an
ASCII format readable by the pharmacist's system.
Once you select this option, the computer may display a "TZ" warning message
informing you that the "config.sys" program needs to be updated with a parameter that
sets the machines local time as a set number of hours less than GMT. Rather than alter
the configuration of the user's PC, this parameter is left unset. It does not affect the
operation of the prototype system in any way.
The computer will display each prescription file name (e.g. 9900001.dat) and ask for the
password for the private-key of the pharmacy (based on the name of the pharmacy typed
in the prescription file when the prescription was created). Enter the password of:
FAIR78 for DRUG FAIR or RITE56 for RITE AID (these are the two pharmacies that
have private keys established in the prototype system). Please note that these passwords
must be entered using UPPER CASE TEXT. You may also enter the password of any
new pharmacy that you added to the system using the "CREATE PGP KEY PAIRS"
option, discussed later in this section of the report.
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When the decryption process takes place, the prescription file name will remain the same,
but the file extension will change from .pgp to .dat (the original encrypted file will also
be left in the c:\prescrip\pharmasubdirectory for the user to view and verifY that the PGP
process in the prototype system is working). If an invalid password is entered, the
computer will display a warning message and ask you to re-enter the pharmacy's privatekey password. After three invalid attempts, the computer will not decrypt the
prescription and move to the next prescription in the batch file.
Please note, if you run the process more than once, the Gomputer will recognize the
existence of any .dat prescription files within the pharmacist's system. The computer will
display a warning message stating that the file already exists and will ask if you want to
overwrite it. Please type in a "y" (for yes). The process may be run any number of times
and the information will simply be overlaid in the file system.
After a valid password is entered, the computer displays the digital signature of the
physician who created (signed) the prescription. The computer also displays the name
and time that the prescription was created (note, since the TZ parameter is not set, the
system will use GMT).
When the last prescription has been decrypted, the computer will return to the main
menu.

PHARMACIST'S PROGRAM
Select option 2 on the pharmacist's program to enter dispense a prescription (you can
press ESC, followed by RETURN at any time to return to this screen). The system will
bring up the prescription data entry screen. There are sixteen data elements on this
screen. The first 15 elements were filled in by the physician and cannot be altered. The
last field at the bottom of the screen is for the pharmacist to enter the name of the drug
that was actually dispensed. Type the name of the drug and press the ENTER key.
Pressing ENTER stores the value that you typed in the field.
If you begin to over-write the value contained in this field and wish to restore the field
contents to their original value, press the PAGE-UP key (you must do this before pressing
the ENTER key). You can exit the screen WITHOUT saving the contents by pressing the
FlO or ESC key. You can save the prescription by pressing the END key. The default
values for these keys are displayed at the bottom of the screen.
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PHARMACIST'S PROGRAM-DELETING PRESCRIPTIONS

You may delete an existing prescription at any time by selecting option #3 at the main
menu. The systemwill ask you for the prescription number. Enter the number and press
RETURN. If you have forgotten the prescription number, follow the procedures in the
"PHARMACIST'S PROGRAM- LOOKlNG UP PRESCRIPTION NUMBERS AND
NAMES" section.
If you enter an invalid number, the system will "beep" and return you to the main
pharmacist's menu. If you enter a valid number, the system will display a warning
message that you are about to delete the prescription. If you confirm the deletion, the
prescription will be permanently deleted. You can press ESC, followed by the RETURN
key to delete the prescription.

PHARMACIST'S PROGRAM- LOOKING UP PRESCRIPTION NUMBERS AND
NAMES
You can lookup the prescription numbers of all prescriptions that exist in the
pharmacist's system for a patient, based on the patient's name, and you can lookup a
patient's name based on the prescription number by selecting option #4 at the main menu.
The system will ask if you wish to lookup the data based on (n)ame or (p)rescription
number. Enter a "n" or a "p". The system will then ask you to enter the prescription
number or the first part of the patient's last name. Type in the patient's last name (or the
first few letters of the last name). The system will then display a list of all prescriptions
meeting the search criteria. The information includes the prescription number, patient
name, date that the prescription was issued, the name of the drug, and a status as to
whether the prescription has been filled or not. Press ESC followed by ENTER to return
to the main menu.

PHARMACIST'S PROGRAM- EXITING THE PROGRAM
You can exit the pharmacist's program by selecting option number 5 at the main menu.

VIEW PGP KEYS
Select option C from the main menu. Select option A on the PGP system menu. This
will display a list of the names of the physician's and pharmacist's that have PGP keypairs created for them. This program will display the key-size (in bits), the date that the
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key was generated, the key-ID, and the name of the user. The private password is never
displayed. If you generate a key and forget the password, the key can no longer be used.

PGP KEY GENERATION
Select option C from the main menu. Select option B on the PGP system menu. This will
enable you to create new PGP key-pairs. Please follow the on-screen prompts to create
the key. Please use UPPER CASE letters when creating the user name and password.
Also, please write down the password, since the system does not allow you to look it up.

III

AppendixE
Prototype System Program Listings
PROGRAM LISTING OF THE PHYSICIAN'S PROGRAM (PROGRAM2.BAS)
4 REM PROTOTYPE PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEM WRITTEN BY DONALD R.
LEMMA AS A PARTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR A Ph.D. DEGREE FROM NOVA SOUTHEASTERN
UNIVERSITY
5 DEF SEG=.&H40: POKE &H17, 64 :DEF SEG
6 CLS: SCREEN 0: COLOR 7,0: CLEAR: KEY OFF: WIDTH "lptl:",230
7 FOR X=l TO 10: KEY X,"": NEXT
8 ON KEY(10) GOSUB 35000
9 KEY(10) ON
10
DOTS$=" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

"
11 BLANKS$="
If.
CHDIR"\PRESCRIP": DIRECTORY$="PHYSICIAN"
13 DIM A$(2000) ,B$(10) ,L(35) ,X(35) ,Y(35)
14 RESTORE: FOR X=l TO 16: READ L (X) , X (X) , Y (X): NEXT X
20 CLS
21 ON ERROR GOTO 31000
25 DATE2$=RIGHT$ {DATE$,2)+LEFT$ (DATE$,2) +MID$ (DATE$,4,2)
30 COLOR 2,0: PRINT TAB (25) i"PHYSICIAN'S PROGRAM MASTER
MENU";TAB(69) ;DATE$: PRINT: COLOR 15,0
40 PRINT "1
ADD A NEW PRESCRIPTION": PRINT
50 PRINT "2
CHANGE/LOOKUP A PRESCRIPTION
60 PRINT "3
DELETE A PRESCRIPTION": PRINT
150 PRINT "4
RECALL PRESCRIPTION # BY PATIENT NAME
290 PRINT "5
EXIT PROGRAM
350 LOCATE 24,1: PRINT "SELECTION"; : INPUT A
380 SCREEN 0
390 CLS
400 IF A=l THEN 1000
410 IF A=2 THEN 2000
420 IF A=3 THEN 3000
450 IF A=4 THEN 12000
665 IF A=5 THEN CLS: SYSTEM
690 MSG$="******************* INCORRECT SELECTION, PLEASE TRY AGAIN
********************": GOTO 30000
1000 CLS
1010 GOSUB 32000
1020 GOSUB 32600
1030 GOSUB 32700
1040 GOSUB 32800: GOTO 20
2000 PRINT "WHAT IS THE PRESCRIPTION NUMBER"i: INPUT A$: D$=A$:
A$=A$+" .DAT"
2005 CLS
2010 GOSUB 31100
2020 GOSUB 32000
2030 A$=D$: GOSUB 32700
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2040 GOSUB 32812: GO TO 20
3000 PRINT "WHAT IS THE PRESCRIPTION NUMBER THAT YOU WISH TO ERASE";:
INPUT A$
3018 PRINT "ARE YOU SURE YOU WANT THE FILE PERMENANTLY ERASED (yiN) "i:
LOCATE 2,58: PRINT "N"i: LOCATE 2,56: INPUT C$
3019 IF C$<>"Y" AND C$<>"y" THEN MSG$="
***************************
PERMIT NOT ERASED ************************": GOTO 30000
3025 B=VAL (A$)
3030 A$=A$+".DAT"
3040 GOSUB 34600: KILL A$
3060 GOTO 20
4000 CLS: PRINT "WHAT IS THE PRESCT # THAT YOU WISH TO MAKE INACTIVE";:
INPUT A$
4010 A$=A$+".DAT"
4020 GOSUB 31100
4040 CHDIR "ARCHIVES": GOSUB 34500: GOSUB 31700
4050 CHDIR "\PRESCRIP": GOSUB 34600: KILL A$: GOTO 4000
5000 CLS: PRINT "WHAT IS THE PERMIT # DO YOU WISH TO MAKE ACTIVE"i:
INPUT A$: A$=A$+".DAT"
5030 CHDIR "ARCHIVES": GOSUB 31100: GOSUB 34600: KILL A$
5036 CHDIR "\PRESCRIP": GOSUB 31700: GOSUB 34500: GOTO 5000
6000 PRINT "WHAT IS THE STRING THAT YOU WISH TO SEARCH FOR? "i: LINE
INPUT B$
6010 PRINT "ALIGN THE PRINTER AND PRESS «RETURN» TO BEGIN THE
PRINTOUT."i: LINE INPUT A$
6020 LPRINT "GLOBAL SEARCH FOR THE STRING «"iB$i"»
6030 LPRINT "PRINTED ON "iDATE$
6040 LPRINT
6050 LPRINT "PRESCR #
NAME
6055 LPRINT ,,-------6060 LPRINT
6070 OPEN "CHART.FIL" FOR INPUT AS #2
6075 ON ERROR GOTO 6900
6080 IF EOF(2) THEN CLOSE#2: LPRINT CHR$(12)i: CLS: GO TO 6000
6090 LINE INPUT #2,C$: E$=MID$(C$,31,38): D$=LEFT$(C$,30):
C$=MID$(C$,69,8): A$=C$+".DAT"
6110 FOR X=1 TO 35
6120 A=O: FOR Y=1 TO LEN(A$(X»
6130 IF B$=MID$(A$(X),Y,LEN(B$»
THEN A=1: GOTO 6160
6140 NEXT Y
6150 NEXT X
6160 IF A<>1 THEN 6080
6170 LPRINT A$ (1) iTAB (20) iA$ (2) i ", "iA$ (3): GOTO 6080
6900 RESUME 6910
6910 LPRINT "PRESCR NUMBER "iA$i" DOES NOT EXIST": GOTO 6080
12000 PRINT "DO YOU WISH TO RECALL THE PRESCRIPTION BY PATIENT (N)AME OR
(P)RESCRIPTION #"i: INPUT B$
12010 IF B$="N" OR B$="n" THEN B$="N": PRINT "WHAT IS THE NAME (OR
PORTION OF THE NAME)"i: INPUT U$: GOSUB 34700
12020 IF B$="p" OR B$="P" THEN B$="I": PRINT "WHAT IS THE PRESCRIPTION
NUMBER"i: INPUT U$: GOSUB 34700
12030 LOCATE 25,1: PRINT "PRESS «RETURN» TO GO TO LOOKUP ANOTHER"i:
LINE INPUT A$: CLS: GOTO 12000
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30000 CLS: BEEP: LOCATE 12,1: PRINT MSG$
30010 FOR X=l TO 10000: NEXT: GOTO 20
31000 CLS: LOCATE 12,1: BEEP: PRINT "******************************
ERROR, FILE NOT FOUND ***************************": COLOR 7,0
31005 CLOSE
31010 FOR X=l TO 10000: NEXT
31015 CHDIR "\PRESCRIP": DIRECTORY$="MASTER": RESUME 20
31100 OPEN A$ FOR INPUT AS #1
31110 C=O
31120 IF EOF(l) THEN 31200
31125 C=C+1
31130 LINE INPUT #1, A$(C): GOTO 31120
31200 CLOSE #1: RETURN
31700 W$=RIGHT$(STR$(VAL(A$(l»+l) ,7): OPEN "CHART.INF" FOR OUTPUT AS
#1: PRINT #l,W$: CLOSE #1
31705 A$=A$(l)+".dat": OPEN A$ FOR OUTPUT AS #1
31710 FOR X=l TO 16
31720 PRINT #1, A$(X)
31730 NEXT: CLOSE #1: RETURN
32000 LOCATE 2,2:
PRINT "PRESCRIPTION #:"
32005 COLOR 2,0: LOCATE 4,2: PRINT "PATIENT DATA": COLOR 7,0
32010 LOCATE 5,2:
PRINT "PATIENT LAST NAME
PATIENT FIRST NAME:"
32025 COLOR 2,0: LOCATE 8,2: PRINT "PRESCRIPTION DATA": COLOR 7,0
32030 LOCATE 9,2:
PRINT "QUANTITY:
DRUG NAME:"
32040 LOCATE 10,2:
PRINT "STRENGTH/DOSAGE:
REFILLS:"
32050 LOCATE 11,2: PRINT "DATE PRESCRIBED:"
32060 LOCATE 14,2:
PRINT "INSTRUCTIONS
."
32065 COLOR 2,0: LOCATE 17,2: PRINT "PHYSICIAN DATA": COLOR 7,0
32070 LOCATE 18,2: PRINT "PHYSICIAN'S NAME:
DEA #

."
32072 LOCATE 19,2: PRINT "PRIVATE KEY:"
32075 COLOR 2,0: LOCATE 20,2: PRINT "PHARMACY DATA": COLOR 7,0
32080 LOCATE 21,2: PRINT "PHARMACY NAME:

."
32085
32090
7,0
32210
32220
32230
32240
32250
32260
32270
32280
32285
32290
32300
32310
32320
32330

DEA #

LOCATE 22,2: PRINT "PUBLIC KEY . "
LOCATE 23,2: COLOR 4,0: PRINT "DRUG ACTUALLY DISPENSED:": COLOR
RETURN
DATA 8,2,18
DATA 15,5,23
DATA 15,5,62
DATA 3,9,12
DATA 30,9,32
DATA 15,10,19:
DATA 2,10,50:
DATA 10,11,21:
DATA 60,14,19:
DATA 15,18,20:
DATA 10,18,50:
DATA 8,19,15:
DATA 15,21,18:

REM
REM
REM
REM
REM
REM
REM
REM
REM
REM
REM
REM
REM

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

PRESCRIPTION NUMBER
LAST NAME
FIRST NAME
QUANTITY
DRUG NAME
STRENGTH/DOSAGE
REFILLS
DATE PRESCRIBED
INSTRUCTIONS
PHYSICIAN'S NAME
PHYSICIAN'S DEA #
PHYSICIAN'S PRIVATE KEY
PHARMACY NAME
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32340 DATA 10,21,50: REM 14 PHARMACY DEA #
32350 DATA 8,22,15: REM 15 PHARMACY PUBLIC KEY
32360 DATA 30,23,27: REM 16 DRUG ACTUALY DISPENSED
32600 REM DOTS
32610
DOTS$=" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , .......... " .. , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ... , . . . . . . . . . . . .

"
32620 FOR X=l TO 16
32630 A$(X)=LEFT$(DOTS$,L(X»: NEXT X: A$(8)=DATE$: A$(9)="TAKE AS
DIRECTED": A$ (10) = "JOHN SMITH": A$(11)="22-12345"
32635 OPEN "CHART .. INF" FOR INPUT AS #1: LINE INPUT #l,A$ (1): CLOSE #1
32640 RETURN
32700 REM PRINT A$(Z) VARIABLES ON SCREEN
32710 FOR Z=l TO 16
32720 LOCATE X(Z),Y(Z): PRINT A$(Z) i
32730 NEXT Z: RETURN
32800 REM SCREEN ENTRY OF DATA
32812 X=O: COLOR 15,0
32815 LOCATE 25,1: PRINT "HOME-ABORT END-SAVE "iCHR$(25) i"-NEXT FIELD
"iCHR$(24)i"-PREV. FIELD PgUp-UPDATE FlO-MAIN MENU"i
32820 X=X+1: IF X=l THEN X=2
32830 IF X=O THEN X=15
32840 IF X=16 THEN X=2
32842 GOSUB 34000
32845 B$=""
32850 LOCATE X(X) ,Y(X)+LEN(B$),l
32860 C$=INKEY$: IF C$="" THEN 32860
32861 IF LEN(C$)>1 THEN 33500
32865 IF C$=CHR$(13) THEN GOSUB 34200
32866 IF C$=CHR$(13) AND X=8 THEN LOCATE X(X),Y(X): PRINT B$i: PRINT
LEFT$(BLANKS$,L(X)-LEN(B$» i : A$(X)=B$: GO TO 32820
32867 IF C$=CHR$(13) AND X=10 THEN LOCATE X(X),Y(X): PRINT B$i: PRINT
LEFT$(BLANKS$,L(X)-LEN(B$» i : A$(X)=B$: GO TO 32820
32868 IF C$=CHR$(13) AND X=ll THEN LOCATE X(X) ,Y(X): PRINT B$i: PRINT
LEFT$(BLANKS$,L(X)-LEN(B$» i : A$(X)=B$: GOTO 32820
32870 IF C$=CHR$(13) THEN LOCATE X(X) ,Y(X): PRINT B$i: PRINT
LEFT$(BLANKS$,L(X)-LEN(B$»: A$(X)=B$: GOTO 32820
32880 IF C$=CHR$(8) AND LEN(B$)=O THEN BEEP: GOTO 32860
32885 IF C$=CHR$(8) THEN B$=LEFT$(B$,LEN(B$)-l): GOTO 32905
32890 IF LEN(B$)=L(X) THEN BEEP: GOTO 32860
32900 B$=B$+C$
32905 LOCATE X(X) ,Y(X): PRINT B$i: IF LEN(B$)<>L(X) THEN PRINT
LEFT$(DOTS$,L(X)-LEN(B$» i
32910 GOTO 32850
32920 LOCATE 25,1: PRINT "
33500 IF ASC(RIGHT$(C$,l»=71 THEN GOSUB 33600
33510 IF ASC(RIGHT$(C$,l»=79 THEN GOSUB 33560
33520 IF ASC(RIGHT$(C$,l»=80 THEN GOSUB 33580
33530 IF ASC(RIGHT$(C$,l»=72 THEN GOSUB 33595
33540 IF ASC(RIGHT$(C$,l»=73 THEN GOSUB 33596
33550 GOTO 32860
33560 RETURN 33562
33562 IF F$="NEW" THEN A$(32)="X"

115
33564 REM IF F$="CHANGE" AND A$(32)<>"X" THEN A$(30)="X"
33570 GOSUB 31700: IF A=l THEN GOSUB 34500
33575 GOSUB 33600
33580 RETuRN 32820
33595 X=X-2: RETURN 32820
33596 LOCATE X(X),Y(X): PRINT A$(X)+LEFT$(BLANKS$,L(X)+l-LEN(A$(X»);:
RETURN 32820
33600 KEY(l) OFF: KEY(2) OFF: KEY(3) OFF: KEY(4) OFF: KEY(5) OFF
33610 COLOR 7,0: CLS: IF A=l THEN RETURN 1000 ELSE RETURN 2000
33615 LOCATE 25,1: PRINT
33700 REM OFFICE CODES
33710 PRINT ALINE$: PRINT BLINE$: PRINT CLINE$: PRINT DLINE$: PRINT
ELINE$: PRINT FLINE$: PRINT GLINE$
33799 RETURN
34000 REM MESSAGES FOR INPUT/ENTRY SCREEN
34005 LOCATE 1,2
34008 IF X=l THEN PRINT "ENTER THE ID NUMBER FOR THIS PRESCRIPTION
" ,..... RETURN
34010 IF X=2 THEN PRINT "ENTER THE LAST NAME OF THE PATIENT
" ,..... RETURN
34012 IF X=3 THEN PRINT "ENTER THE FIRST NAME OF THE PATIENT
II ....
, . RETURN
34014 IF X=4 THEN PRINT "ENTER THE QUANTITY OF THE DRUG TO BE DISPENSED
II ....
, . RETURN
34016 IF X=5 THEN PRINT "ENTER THE NAME OF THE DRUG TO BE DISPENSED
, . RETURN
34018 IF X>5 AND X<13 THEN PRINT "DATA MUST BE ENTERED IN THIS FIELD
";: RETURN
34050 IF X=16 THEN PRINT "DATA ENTRY PROHIBITED IN THIS FIELD. THE
FIELD IS UPDATED BY THE PHARMACIST ";: RETURN
34060 PRINT "
";: RETURN
34100 REM NEXT AVAILABLE CHART NUMBER UPDATE SUBROUTINE
34110 CLS: PRINT "WHAT YOU YOU LIKE THE NEXT PERMIT NUMBER TO BE";:
INPUT A$
34115 OPEN "CHART.INF" FOR OUTPUT AS #1
34120 PRINT #1, A$: CLOSE#l: GO TO 20
34200 REM DATA ENTRY/UPDATE ACTION SUBROUTINE
34205 IF X=l AND CHART$=B$ THEN OPEN "CHART.INF" FOR OUTPUT AS #1:
CHART$=STR$(VAL(B$)+l): PRINT #1, CHART$: CLOSE #1: RETURN
34210 IF X<13 AND B$='''' THEN BEEP: LOCATE 1,2: PRINT "THIS FIELD MUST BE
ENTERED
": FOR Z=l TO 10000: NEXT Z: X=X-l: B$=A$ (X) :
RETURN
34280 RETURN
34500 OPEN "CHART.FIL" FOR APPEND AS #1
34510 B$=LEFT$(A$(1)+BLANKS$,8)+" "+LEFT$(A$(2)+BLANKS$,30)+" "+A$(17):
PRINT #1, B$
34520 CLOSE #1: RETURN
34600 OPEN "CHART.FIL" FOR INPUT AS #1: OPEN "TEMP.TMP" FOR OUTPUT AS #2
34605 IF EOF(l) THEN 34660
34610 LINE INPUT #l,G$: C$=LEFT$(G$,8)
34615 IF RIGHT$(C$,l)=" " THEN C$=LEFT$(C$,LEN(C$)-l): GO TO 34615
34620 IF C$=LEFT$(A$,LEN(A$)-4) THEN 34605
II ....
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34630 PRINT #2, G$
34640 GOTO 34605
34660 CLOSE #1: CLOSE #2: KILL "CHART.FIL": NAME "TEMP.TMP" AS
'''CHART. FIL"
34670 RETURN
34700 OPEN "CHART.FIL" FOR INPUT AS #2
34701 CLS: PRINT "A SEARCH FOR ";U$;" YIELDS THE FOLLOWING RESULTS:"
34702 PRINT: PRINT "SCRIP #";TAB(10) ; "LAST NAME";TAB(22) ;"lst
NAME" ; TAB (34) ; "DATE PSBD" ; TAB (46) ; "DRUG PRESCRIBED" ; TAB (69) i "STATUS"
34703 PRINT
34705 IF EOF(2) THEN CLOSE#2: RETURN
34710 LINE INPUT #2,C$: E$=LEFT$(C$,8): Q$=E$: D$=MID$(C$,10,30)
34715 IF RIGHT$(E$,l)=" " THEN E$=LEFT$(E$,LEN(E$)-l): GO TO 34715
34720 IF B$="I" AND E$=U$ THEN 34745
34730 IF B$="N" AND LEFT$(D$,LEN(U$»=U$ THEN 34745
34740 GO TO 34705
34745 IF RIGHT$(Q$,l)=" " THEN Q$=LEFT$(Q$,LEN(Q$)-l): GO TO 34745
34747 A$=Q$+".DAT": GOSUB 31100
34748 IF LEFT$(A$(16),l)="." OR A$(16)="" THEN P$="UNFILLED" ELSE
P$="FILLED"
34750 PRINT
E$i TAB(10) i LEF T$(A$(2) ,10) ;TAB(22) iLEFT$(A$(3) ,10) ;TAB(34) iLEFT$(A$(8) ,1
0) ;TAB(46) i LEF T$(A$(5) ,20) iTAB(69) iP$: GO TO 34705
34751 REM PRINT E$iTAB(20) iD$i: GO TO 34705
35000 CLOSE: RETURN 20
37000 END
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PROGRAM LISTING OF THE PHYSICIAN'S ENCRYPTION AND DIGITAL
SIGNATURE TRANSFER PROGRAM (XFERPGP.BAS)
10 KEY OFF: DIM A$(16)
20 PRINT "PGP ENCRYPTION ROUTINE
25 OPEN "XFERPGP.BAT" FOR APPEND AS #1: CLOSE #1: KILL "XFERPGP.BAT"
30 PRINT "DO YOU WISH TO (T)RANSMIT THE FILES OR (E)XIT"i: INPUT A$
40 IF A$="T" OR A$="t" THEN 1000
60 IF A$="E" OR A$="e" THEN SYSTEM
70 BEEP: GOTO 30
1000 OPEN "CHART.FIL" FOR INPUT AS #1
1005 IF EOF(l) THEN 1500
1007 LINE INPUT #1, B$
1008 Q$=LEFT$(B$,8)
1009 IF RIGHT$(Q$,l)=" " THEN Q$=LEFT$(Q$,LEN(Q$)-l): GOTO 1009
1010 C$=Q$+".DAT"
1020 OPEN C$ FOR INPUT AS #2
1030 FOR X=l TO 16
1040 LINE INPUT #2, A$(X)
1050 NEXT X
1060 CLOSE #2
1070 IF A$(10)="" OR LEFT$(A$(10) ,1)=" " OR LEFT$(A$(10),1)="." THEN
BEEP: PRINT "WARNING- FILE # "iA$(l) i" FOR "iA$(2) i" CANNOT BE ENCRYPTED
SINCE PHYSICIAN'S NAME WAS NOT ENTERED.
PRESS RETURN TO ACKNOWLEDGE"i:
LINE INPUT G$: GO TO 1005
1080 IF A$(13)="" OR LEFT$(A$(13) ,1)=" " OR LEFT$(A$(13),1)="." THEN
BEEP: PRINT "WARNING- FILE # "iA$(l) i" FOR "iA$(2) i" CANNOT BE ENCRYPTED
SINCE PHARMACY'S NAME WAS NOT ENTERED.
PRESS RETURN TO ACKNOWLEDGE"i:
LINE INPUT G$: GO TO 1005
1090 G$="PGP -EST "+C$+" "+A$(13)+" -U "+A$(10)
1100 H$="COPY "+Q$+".PGP"+" \PRESCRIP\PHARMA\*.*"
1110 OPEN "XFERPGP.BAT" FOR APPEND AS #2
1120 PRINT #2,G$
1130 PRINT #2,H$
1140 CLOSE #2
1150 GO TO 1005
1500 CLOSE #1
1510 OPEN "XFERPGP.BAT" FOR APPEND AS #1
1520 G$="COPY CHART.FIL C:\PRESCRIP\PHARMA\CHART.FIL": PRINT #l,G$:
CLOSE #1
9000 CLOSE #1: CLOSE #2: SYSTEM

PROGRAM LISTING OF THE PHARMACIST'S PROGRAM (PROGRAM3.BAS)
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4 REM PROTOTYPE PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEM WRITTEN BY DONALD R.
LEMMA AS A PARTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR A Ph.D. DEGREE FROM NOVA SOUTHEASTERN
UNIVERSITY
5 DEF SEG=&H40:POKE &H17,64:DEF SEG
6 CLS: SCREEN 0: COLOR 7,0: CLEAR: KEY OFF: WIDTH "lpt1:",230
7 FOR X=l TO 10: KEY X,"": NEXT
8 ON KEY(10) GOSUB 35000
9 KEY(10) ON
10
DOTS$=" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '"

..................... .

"

11 BLANKS$="
II.
CHDIR"\PRESCRIP\PHARMA": DIRECTORY$="PHYSICIAN"
13 DIM A$(2000) ,B$(10) ,L(35) ,X(35),Y(35)
14 RESTORE: FOR X=l TO 16: READ L(X),X(X),Y(X): NEXT X
20 CLS
21 ON ERROR GOTO 31000
25 DATE2$=RIGHT$(DATE$,2)+LEFT$(DATE$,2)+MID$(DATE$,4,2)
30 COLOR 2,0: PRINT TAB (25) i"PHARMACIST'S PROGRAM MASTER
MENU" iTAB (69) iDATE$: PRINT: COLOR 15,0
40 PRINT "1
RESERVED
50 PRINT "2
DISPENSE MEDICATION
60 PRINT "3
DELETE A PRESCRIPTION": PRINT
150 PRINT "4
RECALL PRESCRIPTION # BY PATIENT NAME
290 PRINT "5
EXIT PROGRAM
350 LOCATE 24,1: PRINT "SELECTION" i : INPUT A
380 SCREEN 0
390 CLS
410 IF A=2 THEN 2000
420 IF A=3 THEN 3000
450 IF A=4 THEN 12000
665 IF A=5 THEN CLS: SYSTEM
690 MSG$="******************* INCORRECT SELECTION, PLEASE TRY AGAIN
********************": GOTO 30000
1000 CLS
1010 GOSUB 32000
1020 GOSUB 32600
1030 GOSUB 32700
1040 GOSUB 32800: GO TO 20
2000 PRINT "WHAT IS THE PRESCRIPTION NUMBER"i: INPUT A$: D$=A$:
A$=A$+" .DAT"
2005 CLS
2010 GOSUB 31100
2020 GOSUB 32000
2030 A$=D$: GOSUB 32700
2040 GOSUB 32812: GOTO 20
3000 PRINT "WHAT IS THE PRESCRIPTION NUMBER THAT YOU WISH TO ERASE"i:
INPUT A$
3018 PRINT "ARE YOU SURE YOU WANT THE FILE PERMENANTLY ERASED (Y/N)"i:
LOCATE 2,58: PRINT "N"i: LOCATE 2,56: INPUT C$
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3019 IF C$<>"Y" AND C$<>"y" THEN MSG$="
***************************
PERMIT NOT ERASED ************************": GO TO 30000
3025 B=VAL(A$)
3030 A$=A$+".DAT"
3040 GO SUB 34600: KILL A$
3060 GOTO 20
4000 CLS: PRINT "WHAT IS THE PRESCT # THAT YOU WISH TO MAKE INACTIVE";:
INPUT A$
4010 A$=A$+".DAT"
4020 GOSUB 31100
4040 CHDIR "ARCHIVES": GOSUB 34500: GOSUB 31700
4050 CHDIR "\PRESCRIP\PHARMA": GOSUB 34600: KILL A$: GO TO 4000
5000 CLS: PRINT "WHAT IS THE PERMIT # DO YOU WISH TO MAKE ACTIVE"j:
INPUT A$: A$=A$+".DAT"
5030 CHDIR "ARCHIVES": GOSUB 31100: GOSUB 34600: KILL A$
5036 CHDIR "\PRESCRIP\PHARMA": GOSUB 31700: GOSUB 34500: GOTO 5000
6000 PRINT "WHAT IS THE STRING THAT YOU WISH TO SEARCH FOR? "j: LINE
INPUT B$
6010 PRINT "ALIGN THE PRINTER AND PRESS «RETURN» TO BEGIN THE
PRINTOUT."j: LINE INPUT A$
6020 LPRINT "GLOBAL SEARCH FOR THE STRING «"jB$j"»
6030 LPRINT "PRINTED ON "jDATE$
6040 LPRINT
6050 LPRINT "PRESCR #
NAME
6055 LPRINT ,,-------6060 LPRINT
6070 OPEN "CHART.FIL" FOR INPUT AS #2
6075 ON ERROR GO TO 6900
6080 IF EOF(2) THEN CLOSE#2: LPRINT CHR$(12) i : CLS: GO TO 6000
6090 LINE INPUT #2,C$: E$=MID$(C$,31,38): D$=LEFT$(C$,30):
C$=MID$(C$,69,8): A$=C$+".DAT"
6110 FOR X=l TO 35
6120 A=O: FOR Y=l TO LEN(A$(X»
6130 IF B$=MID$(A$(X),Y,LEN(B$» THEN A=l: GOTO 6160
6140 NEXT Y
6150 NEXT X
6160 IF A<>l THEN 6080
6170 LPRINT A$ (1) jTAB (20) jA$ (2) j", "jA$ (3): GOTO 6080
6900 RESUME 6910
6910 LPRINT "PRESCR NUMBER " j A$j" DOES NOT EXIST": GO TO 6080
12000 PRINT "DO YOU WISH TO RECALL THE PRESCRIPTION BY PATIENT (N)AME OR
(P)RESCRIPTION #"j: INPUT B$
12010 IF B$="N" OR B$="n" THEN B$="N": PRINT "WHAT IS THE NAME (OR
PORTION OF THE NAME)"j: INPUT U$: GOSUB 34700
12020 IF B$="p" OR B$="P" THEN B$="I": PRINT "WHAT IS THE PRESCRIPTION
NUMBER"j: INPUT U$: GOSUB 34700
12030 LOCATE 25,1: PRINT "PRESS «RETURN» TO GO TO LOOKUP ANOTHER"j:
LINE INPUT A$: CLS: GOTO 12000
30000 CLS: BEEP: LOCATE 12,1: PRINT MSG$
30010 FOR X=l TO 10000: NEXT: GO TO 20
31000 CLS: LOCATE 12,1: BEEP: PRINT "******************************
ERROR, FILE NOT FOUND ***************************": COLOR 7,0
31005 CLOSE
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31010 FOR X=l TO 10000: NEXT
31015 CHDIR "\PRESCRIP\PHARMA": DIRECTORY$="MASTER": RESUME 20
31100 OPEN A$ FOR INPUT AS #1
31110 C=O

31120 IF EOF(l) THEN 31200
31125 C=C+l

31130 LINE INPUT #1, A$(C): GOTO 31120
31200 CLOSE #1: RETURN
31700 W$=RIGHT$(STR$(VAL(A$(1))+1),7): OPEN "CHART.INF" FOR OUTPUT AS
#1: PRINT #l,W$: CLOSE #1
31705 A$=A$(l)+".dat": OPEN A$ FOR OUTPUT AS #1
31710 FOR X=l TO 16
31720 PRINT #1, A$(X)
31730 NEXT: CLOSE #1: RETURN
32000 LOCATE 2,2: PRINT "PRESCRIPTION #:"
32005 COLOR 2,0: LOCATE 4,2: PRINT "PATIENT DATA": COLOR 7,0
32010 LOCATE 5,2: PRINT "PATIENT LAST NAME
PATIENT FIRST NAME:"
32025 COLOR 2,0: LOCATE 8,2: PRINT "PRESCRIPTION DATA": COLOR 7,0
32030 LOCATE 9,2: PRINT "QUANTITY:
DRUG NAME:"
32040 LOCATE 10,2: PRINT "STRENGTH/DOSAGE:
REFILLS:"
32050 LOCATE 11,2: PRINT "DATE PRESCRIBED:"
32060 LOCATE 14,2: PRINT "INSTRUCTIONS
."
32065 COLOR 2,0: LOCATE 17,2: PRINT "PHYSICIAN DATA": COLOR 7,0
DEA #
32070 LOCATE 18,2: PRINT "PHYSICIAN'S NAME:

."
32072 LOCATE 19,2: PRINT "PRIVATE KEY:"
32075 COLOR 2,0: LOCATE 20,2: PRINT "PHARMACY DATA": COLOR 7,0
32080 LOCATE 21,2: PRINT "PHARMACY NAME:

DEA #

."
32085
32090
7,0
32210
32220
32230
32240
32250
32260
32270
32280
32285
32290
32300
32310
32320
32330
32340
32350
32360
32600

LOCATE 22,2: PRINT "PUBLIC KEY'"
LOCATE 23,2: COLOR 4,0: PRINT "DRUG ACTUALLY DISPENSED:": COLOR
RETURN
DATA 8,2,18
DATA 15,5,23
DATA 15,5,62
DATA 3,9,12
DATA 30,9,32
DATA 15,10,19:
DATA 2,10,50:
DATA 10,11,21:
DATA 60,14,19:
DATA 15,18,20:
DATA 10,18,50:
DATA 8,19,15:
DATA 15,21,18:
DATA 10,21,50:
DATA 8,22,15:
DATA 30,23,27:
REM DOTS

REM
REM
REM
REM
REM
REM
REM
REM
REM
REM
REM
REM
REM
REM
REM
REM

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

PRESCRIPTION NUMBER
LAST NAME
FIRST NAME
QUANTITY
DRUG NAME
STRENGTH/DOSAGE
REFILLS
DATE PRESCRIBED
INSTRUCTIONS
PHYSICIAN'S NAME
PHYSICIAN'S DEA #
PHYSICIAN'S PRIVATE KEY
PHARMACY NAME
PHARMACY DEA #
PHARMACY PUBLIC KEY
DRUG ACTUALY DISPENSED
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32610
DOTS$=" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

"
32620 FOR X=l TO 16
32630 A$(X)=LEFT$(DOTS$,L(X»: NEXT X: A$(8)=DATE$: A$(9)="TAKE AS
DIRECTED": A$(10)="JOHN SMITH": A$(11)="22-12345"
32635 OPEN "CHART.INF" FOR INPUT AS #1: LINE INPUT #l,A$(l): CLOSE #1
32640 RETURN
32700 REM PRINT A$(Z) VARIABLES ON SCREEN
32710 FOR Z=l TO 16
32720 LOCATE X(Z) ,Y(Z): PRINT A$(Z) i
32730 NEXT Z: RETURN
32800 REM SCREEN ENTRY OF DATA
32812 X=O: COLOR 15,0
32815 LOCATE 25,1: PRINT "HOME-ABORT END-SAVE "iCHR$(25)i"-NEXT FIELD
"iCHR$(24)i"-PREV. FIELD PgUp-UPDATE FlO-MAIN MENU"i
32820 X=16
32842 GOSUB 34000
32845 B$=""
32850 LOCATE X(X) ,Y(X)+LEN(B$),1
32860 C$=INKEY$: IF C$="" THEN 32860
32861 IF LEN(C$)>1 THEN 33500
32865 IF C$=CHR$(13) THEN GOSUB 34200
32866 IF C$=CHR$(13) AND X=8 THEN LOCATE X(X),Y(X): PRINT B$i: PRINT
LEFT$(BLANKS$,L(X)-LEN(B$» i : A$(X)=B$: GO TO 32820
32867 IF C$=CHR$(13) AND X=10 THEN LOCATE X(X) ,Y(X): PRINT B$i: PRINT
LEFT$(BLANKS$,L(X)-LEN(B$» i : A$(X)=B$: GOTO 32820
32868 IF C$=CHR$(13) AND X=ll THEN LOCATE X(X) ,Y(X): PRINT B$i: PRINT
LEFT$(BLANKS$,L(X)-LEN(B$» i : A$(X)=B$: GOTO 32820
32870 IF C$=CHR$(13) THEN LOCATE X(X) ,Y(X): PRINT B$i: PRINT
LEFT$(BLANKS$,L(X)-LEN(B$»: A$(X)=B$: GOTO 32820
32880 IF C$=CHR$(8) AND LEN(B$)=0 THEN BEEP: GOTO 32860
32885 IF C$=CHR$(8) THEN B$=LEFT$(B$,LEN(B$)-l): GOTO 32905
32890 IF LEN(B$)=L(X) THEN BEEP: GOTO 32860
32900 B$=B$+C$
32905 LOCATE X(X),Y(X): PRINT B$i: IF LEN(B$) <>L(X) THEN PRINT
LEFT$(DOTS$,L(X)-LEN(B$» i
32910 GOTO 32850
32920 LOCATE 25,1: PRINT"
33500 IF ASC(RIGHT$(C$,1»=71 THEN GOSUB 33600
33510 IF ASC(RIGHT$(C$,1»=79 THEN GOSUB 33560
33520 IF ASC(RIGHT$(C$,1»=80 THEN GOSUB 33580
33530 IF ASC(RIGHT$(C$,1»=72 THEN GOSUB 33595
33540 IF ASC(RIGHT$(C$,1»=73 THEN GOSUB 33596
33550 GO TO 32860
33560 RETURN 33562
33562 IF F$="NEW" THEN A$(32)="X"
33564 REM IF F$="CHANGE" AND A$(32)<>"X" THEN A$(30)="X"
33570 GOSUB 31700: IF A=l THEN GOSUB 34500
33575 GOSUB 33600
33580 RETURN 32820
33595 X=X-2: RETURN 32820
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33596 LOCATE X(X),Y(X): PRINT A$(X)+LEFT$(BLANKS$,L(X)+l-LEN(A$(X»);:
RETURN 32820
33600 KEY (1) OFF: KEY(2) OFF: KEY(3) OFF: KEY(4) OFF: KEY(5) OFF
33610 COLOR 7,0: CLS: IF A=l THEN RETURN 1000 ELSE RETURN 2000
33615 LOCATE 25,1: PRINT
33700 REM OFFICE CODES
33710 PRINT ALINE$: PRINT BLINE$: PRINT CLINE$: PRINT DLINE$: PRINT
ELINE$: PRINT FLINE$: PRINT GLINE$
33799 RETURN
34000 REM MESSAGES FOR INPUT/ENTRY SCREEN
34005 LOCATE 1,2
34008 IF X=l THEN PRINT "ENTER THE ID NUMBER .FOR THIS PRESCRIPTION
II ....
, . RETURN
34010 IF X=2 THEN PRINT "ENTER THE LAST NAME OF THE PATIENT
II ....
, . RETURN
34012 IF X=3 THEN PRINT "ENTER THE FIRST NAME OF THE PATIENT
" ,..... RETURN
34014 IF X=4 THEN PRINT "ENTER THE QUANTITY OF THE DRUG TO BE DISPENSED
n ,..... RETURN
34016 IF X=5 THEN PRINT "ENTER THE NAME OF THE DRUG TO BE DISPENSED
II ....
, . RETURN
34018 IF X>5 AND X<13 THEN PRINT "DATA MUST BE ENTERED IN THIS FIELD
";: RETURN
34050 IF X=16 THEN PRINT "DATA ENTRY PROHIBITED IN THIS FIELD. THE
FIELD IS UPDATED BY THE PHARMACIST ";: RETURN
34060 PRINT "
";: RETURN
34100 REM NEXT AVAILABLE CHART NUMBER UPDATE SUBROUTINE
34110 CLS: PRINT "WHAT YOU YOU LIKE THE NEXT PERMIT NUMBER TO BE";:
INPUT A$
34115 OPEN "CHART.INF" FOR OUTPUT AS #1
34120 PRINT #1, A$: CLOSE#l: GO TO 20
34200 REM DATA ENTRY/UPDATE ACTION SUBROUTINE
34205 IF X=l AND CHART$=B$ THEN OPEN "CHART.INF" FOR OUTPUT AS #1:
CHART$=STR$(VAL(B$)+l): PRINT #1, CHART$: CLOSE #1: RETURN
34210 IF X<13 AND B$='"' THEN BEEP: LOCATE 1,2: PRINT "THIS FIELD MUST BE
ENTERED
": FOR Z=l TO 10000: NEXT Z: X=X-l: B$=A$ (X) :
RETURN
34280 RETURN
34500 OPEN "CHART.FIL" FOR APPEND AS #1
34510 B$=LEFT$(A$(1)+BLANKS$,8)+" "+LEFT$(A$(2)+BLANKS$,30)+" "+A$(17):
PRINT #1, B$
34520 CLOSE #1: RETURN
34600 OPEN "CHART.FIL" FOR INPUT AS #1: OPEN "TEMP.TMP" FOR OUTPUT AS #2
34605 IF EOF(l) THEN 34660
34610 LINE INPUT #l,G$:C$=LEFT$(G$,8)
34615 IF RIGHT$(C$,l)=" " THEN C$=LEFT$(C$,LEN(C$)-l): GO TO 34615
34620 IF C$=LEFT$(A$,LEN(A$)-4) THEN 34605
34630 PRINT #2, G$
34640 GOTO 34605
34660 CLOSE #1: CLOSE #2: KILL "CHART.FIL": NAME "TEMP.TMP" AS
"CHART.FIL"
34670 RETURN
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34700 OPEN "CHART.FIL" FOR INPUT AS #2
34701 CLS: PRINT "A S~ARCH FOR "iU$i" YIELDS THE FOLLOWING RESULTS:"
34702 PRINT: PRINT "SCRIP #"iTAB(10)i"LAST NAME"iTAB(22) i"lst
NAME" iTAB (34) i "DATE PSBD" iTAB (46) i "DRUG PRESCRIBED" iTAB (69) i "STATUS"
34703 PRINT
34705 IF EOF(2) THEN CLOSE#2: RETURN
34710 LINE INPUT #2,C$: E$=LEFT$(C$,8): Q$=E$: D$=MID$(C$,10,30)
34715 IF RIGHT$(E$,l)=" " THEN E$=LEFT$(E$,LEN(E$)-l): GOTO 34715
34720 IF B$="I" AND E$=U$ THEN 34745
34730 IF B$="N" AND LEFT$(D$,LEN(U$»=U$ THEN 34745
34740 GO TO 34705
34745 IF RIGHT$(Q$,l)=" " THEN Q$=LEFT$(Q$,LEN(Q$)-l): GOTO 34745
34747 A$=Q$+".DAT": GOSUB 31100
34748 IF LEFT$(A$(16),l)="." OR A$(16)="" THEN P$="UNFILLED" ELSE
P$="FILLED"
34750 PRINT
E$iTAB(10) iLEFT$(A$(2),10) iTAB(22)iLEFT$(A$(3) ,10) iTAB(34)iLEFT$(A$(8),l
0) i T AB(46) iLEFT$(A$(5),20)iTAB(69) i P$: GOTO 34705
34751 REM PRINT E$iTAB(20) iD$i: GOTO 34705
35000 CLOSE: RETURN 20
37000 END

PROGRAM LISTING OF THE PHARMACIST'S DECRYPTION AND
AUTHENTICATION IMPORT PROGRAM (XFERPGP3.BAS)
10 KEY OFF: DIM A$(16)
20 PRINT "PGP DECRYPTION ROUTINE
25 OPEN "XFERPGP3.BAT" FOR APPEND AS #1: CLOSE #1: KILL "XFERPGP3.BAT"
30 PRINT "DO YOU WISH TO (D)ECRYPT THE FILES OR (E)XIT"i: INPUT A$
40 IF A$="D" OR A$="d" THEN 1000
60 IF A$="E" OR A$="e" THEN SYSTEM
70 BEEP: GOTO 30
1000 OPEN "CHART.FIL" FOR INPUT AS #1
1005 IF EOF(l) THEN 1500
1007 LINE INPUT #1, B$
1008 Q$=LEFT$(B$,8)
1009
1010
1020
1030
1040
1050
1060
1500
1550

IF RIGHT$(Q$,l)=" " THEN Q$=LEFT$(Q$,LEN(Q$)-l): GO TO 1009
C$=Q$+".DAT"
G$="PGP -P "+Q$+".PGP"
OPEN "XFERPGP3.BAT" FOR APPEND AS #2
PRINT #2, G$
CLOSE #2
GOTO 1005
CLOSE #1
SYSTEM
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